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Insider Trading in the Hong Kong Stock Market: Facts and Analyses 
ABSTRACT 
Most studies on the foreign stock markets conclude that corporate insiders can earn 
abnormal profits through trading stocks of their own firms. This paper documents 
the characteristics of legal insider transactions of the Hong Kong stock market 
between 1993 and 1998, and examines the abnormal stock price movement 
associated with insider trading. Descriptive statistics are presented for the entire 
sample which includes a total of 541 firms, involving 16,221 open market purchase 
and 7,574 open market sale transactions. To assess the long-run and short-run 
profitability of insiders through insider transactions, abnormal returns associated 
with the insider trading events are calculated on a sample selected on the intensive 
trading criterion. Cumulative average abnormal returns are analyzed for the entire 
intensive trading event sample, as well as for sub-samples grouped by calendar 
time, industry, firm size, book-to-market ratio, price-earnings ratio, and relative 
trading volume of the insider transaction. The issue of whether outsiders can earn 
abnormal profits by mimicking insider transactions is also analyzed. The result 
shows that in the aggregate, insiders are able to earn abnormal profits from both 
insider buying and selling activities in the short-run. Positive abnormal profits 
persist in the long-run for insider sales but not for insider purchases. Both the 
magnitude of the abnormal profits and the duration for which those abnormal 
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profits persists depend significantly on when the transaction occurs, as well as on 
firm-specific and transaction-specific factors. In general, we find that regardless of 
the time specific characteristics, firm-specific characteristics, and volume of the 
transaction, most sale transactions bring abnormal profits to the insiders. Since we 
find prolonged existence of abnormal returns associated with insider sales in many 
cases, outsiders who follow insiders to sell are also very likely to make abnormal 
profits. On the other hand, abnormal profits associated with insider purchases are 
concentrated in certain transactions. For purchase transactions which generate the 
largest and most persistent abnormal profits, their characteristics are that they occur 
in January, the firm concerned is a finance company, the firm is small in terms of 
market value, the book-to-market ratio of the firm is large, the price-earnings ratio 
of the firm is small, and the relative trading volume of the insider purchase is large. 
Outside investors who wish to make abnormal profits from mimicking insider 
buying activities should also follow these transactions. This paper also investigates 
whether aggregate insider trading by industry followed by major industry-wide 
stock price movements are different from that of periods which are not followed by 
such major adjustments. We find that insiders of the industrials, finance, properties, 
and consolidated enterprises industries are more likely to be able to predict major 
industry-wide stock price movements in one calendar month ahead of time and plan 
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The Hong Kong stock market plays a major role in global finance. As of 
end of 2000, the market capitalization of the Hong Kong equity market was HK$ 
4,795，150.07 million. Throughout the years, the Stock Exchange, the Securities and 
Futures Commission, and the Government have been working hard to enhance the 
competitiveness of Hong Kong as an international financial centre. Regulatory 
measures are formulated to ensure a fair, orderly, transparent, and efficient 
financial market. 
However, it has been widely accepted and supported that the efficiency and 
transparency are low in the emerging markets. Very frequently, the emerging stock 
markets are relatively closely held by families and business groups. In a study by 
Claessens et al. (2000), it is reported that about 60% of firms are group-affiliated, 
while 66% are controlled by families in the year 1996 in Hong Kong. In many 
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cases, especially in small firms, the separation of management and ownership is 
rare. Since manager-owners are in general more informed on the business prospects 
of their own firms, insider trading by directors of small corporations are likely to be 
the most profitable. 
Many studies on the foreign stock market conclude that insiders can earn 
abnormal profits through trading stocks of their own firms. See, for example, Jaffe 
(1974)，Finnerty (1976), Givoly and Palmon (1985), Seyhun (1986, 1988), Rozeff 
and Zaman (1988), Lin and Howe (1990)，Chang and Suk (1998) and etc. Besides 
investigating the abnormal performance of stock price around insider transaction, 
another issue that has generated much interest in the public, and has been the focus 
of studies including Seyhun (1986), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Chang and Suk 
(1998), and etc, is whether outsiders are able to earn abnormal profits by 
mimicking the trades of corporate insiders. The conclusions on this issue are 
mixed, however. Another widely studied issue relating to insider trading is whether 
it is good or bad to the market. As early as in the 1960s, this issue was studied by 
Manne (1966). It is suggested by Manne that prices are more informative with the 
existence of insider trading. Meulbroek (1992), Cornell and Sirri (1992) find that 
insider trading actually facilitates the movement of stock prices toward equilibrium. 
Some studies (Glosten (1989), Leland (1992), and Fishman and Hagerty (1992), for 
example) suggest the otherwise. On the other hand, some researchers examine 
insider trading activity in a more general way, and investigate whether aggregate 
insider trading are predictive of aggregate market movements. For example, 
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Seyhun (1998) recently finds that aggregate insider trading activity predicts 
aggregate market movements to a certain extent. However, since most studies on 
insider trading on based on the US insider trading data, the results of these studies 
may not be robust to the Asian or emerging markets. 
The major findings of this study are that even though regulations on insider 
dealings exist in Hong Kong, corporate directors and chief executives are still able 
to make abnormal profits from insider trading. However, when insider trading of 
the Hong Kong stock market is examined in the aggregate sense, contrary to the 
widespread belief, we find that corporate insiders are not making huge profits from 
insider purchase transactions. The result shows that in the aggregate, although 
insiders are able to earn abnormal profits from both insider buying and selling 
activities in the short-run, the magnitude of short-run abnormal profits associated 
with insider sales is considerably larger than that associated with insider purchases. 
In the long-run, insider sales persistently generate positive abnormal profits, but 
insider purchases actually incur losses. Next, when insider transactions are grouped 
by calendar time, industry, firm size, book-to-market ratio, price-earnings ratio, and 
relative trading volume of the insider transaction, we find that both the magnitude 
of the abnormal profits and the duration for which those abnormal profits persists 
depend significantly on when the transaction occurs, as well as on firm-specific and 
transaction-specific factors. In general, we find that regardless of the time specific 
characteristics, firm-specific characteristics, and volume of the transaction, most 
insider sale transactions are highly profitable to the insiders. Also, we find that 
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specific groups of insider transactions actually generate significantly positive and 
persistent abnormal returns. Since very frequently we find prolonged existence of 
abnormal returns associated with insider sales, outsiders who follow insiders to sell 
are also very likely to make abnormal profits. 
For purchase transactions which generate the largest and most persistent 
abnormal profits, their characteristics are that they occur in January, the firm 
concerned is a finance company, the firm is small in terms of market value, the 
book-to-market ratio of the firm is large, the price-earnings ratio of the firm is 
small, and the relative trading volume of the insider purchase is large. Outside 
investors who wish to make abnormal profits by mimicking insider buying 
activities should also follow these transactions. In terms of the predictive ability of 
aggregate insider trading, we have investigated whether aggregate industry-wide 
insider trading prior to major industry-wide stock price movements are different 
from that of periods which are not followed by such major adjustments. We find 
that insiders of the industrials, finance, properties, and consolidated enterprises 
industries are more likely to be able to predict major industry-wide stock price 
movements in one calendar month ahead of time and plan their trades accordingly. 
For insiders of the utilities and the hotels industries, it is possible that in the 
aggregate they are not good at predicting major industry-wide stock price 
movements, or that these insiders do not plan their trades especially according to 
their predictions on major movements in stock prices. The overall results imply that 
5 
tougher regulation on insider trading may be necessary in order to enhance the 
efficiency of the Hong Kong stock market. 
1.2 Objectives 
The main objectives of this paper are to document the characteristics of 
legal insider transactions of the Hong Kong stock market between 1993 and 1998, 
to examine the abnormal stock price movement associated with insider trading, and 
to comment on the short-run and long-run profitability of insiders through insider 
transactions. The cumulative average abnormal returns will be analyzed for the 
entire intensive trading events sample, as well as for sub-samples grouped by 
calendar time, industry of the firm, firm size, book-to-market ratio of the firm, 
price-earnings ratio of the firm, and relative trading volume of the insider 
transaction. The issue of whether outsiders can earn abnormal profits by mimicking 
insider transactions will also be examined. In addition, we will investigate whether 
industry-wide insider trading activities during periods followed by major industry-
wide stock price movements are different from that during periods which are not 
followed by such major adjustments, and therefore are predictive of future 
industry-wide stock price movements. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a brief 
review of literature related to the present study. Section 3 contains is a summary of 
the two Ordinances relating to insider trading in Hong Kong. Section 4 describes 
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the data and the research methodology. Section 5 provides the empirical findings 




2.1 Backgrounds 1 
2.1.1 Information Content and Predictability of Insider Trading 
Insider trading is said to have information content if it conveys certain 
information on the stock or firm concerned, on specific industry, or of the market. 
If aggregate insider trading predicts future stock market movement, then aggregate 
insider trading is having information content. In general, aggregate insider trading 
are separated into two major categories, that is, insider purchases and insider sales. 
The reasonable assumption is that aggregate purchases are more intensive during a 
period before market boom, and aggregate sales are more concentrated before 
market crash. If insiders do not act like what the assumption stated, aggregate 
1 Section 2.1 is written based on views, arguments, and materials presented in various books and 
periodicals, especially in Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), Arshadi and Eyssell (1993), Seyhun 
(1998)，and Gilligan (1999). See the bibliography for a list of the references that are used in the 
preparation of the thesis. 
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insider trading may be described as having little information content. Also, if 
insiders of a particular industry buy or sell stocks of their firms relatively 
intensively for a period, and then certain industry-wide events occur and the stock 
prices of the firms increase or decrease, then insider trading across industry predicts 
the event and the price movement, and it is informative. Likewise, if insider trading 
of an individual firm predicts the price movement of the stock, insider trading is 
informative. The "unusual" movement of stock price can be a result of certain 
events or announcement of the events, including initial public offerings, seasoned 
equity offerings, convertible bond issues, company repurchases of the firm's stock, 
stock splits, mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, dividend initiations, management 
annual earnings forecasts, sell-offs, voluntary liquidation, bankruptcies and etc. 
Sometimes the event or announcement is viewed as unambiguously good or bad 
news by investors on its own, and by itself, the good (or bad) news will bring 
abnormal increases (or decreases) to the stock price. If the event or the 
announcement is a good (or bad) news for the firm and if insiders buy (or sell) 
before the event or the announcement, then such insider transaction is said to have 
information content since it predicts the upcoming of the event and the price 
movement of the stock. 
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2.1.2 Market Efficiency, Market Liquidity and Insider Trading 
Investors value the quality of the securities market in which they invest. 
Two qualities of the market that investors are most concerned with are market 
efficiency and market liquidity. The market is said to be efficient when the market 
price of a security reflects all available information on the firm and its business. 
Also, investors care about the liquidity of the market. A market is liquid if investors 
can dispose of securities at a low cost and on short notice at an appropriate price. 
Investors value the efficiency of the market in which they invest since if the market 
is efficient, the investors need not spend a lot of effort and money to find out the 
appropriate value of the securities that they wish to buy or sell. The efficient market 
does that for the investors. Also, investors value the liquidity of the market since 
when investors wish to dispose of securities that they hold, they can do it cheaply 
and promptly only if the market is liquid. Market efficiency and market liquidity 
are closely related to each other since they both require that the security price to 
reflect the present value of the earnings prospect of the firm, and new information 
is the key determinant of security price. 
Since insiders are the first to access to new information, some researchers 
argue that allowing insiders to trade can make the adjustment of stock price toward 
the "appropriate" price occur more quickly. Researchers who hold opposite view 
argue that insiders will keep the price from adjusting to the "appropriate" price as 
long as possible so that they can make more profit from it. 
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Researchers generally base their test on market efficiency on the weak and 
the semi-strong forms of the efficient market hypothesis. The focus in both 
hypotheses is the speed at which publicly available information is reflected in 
current stock prices. To measure market efficiency empirically, researchers 
determine whether or not the market adjusts immediately to the information 
conveyed in insider trading, and whether or not insiders can earn abnormal returns 
from their trades. Also, the profitability of outsiders who mimic the trade of 
insiders is an indicator of market efficiency. If the market adjusts slowly to the 
information of insider trading, and insiders (and outsiders) can earn abnormal 
returns in their trades, then the market is inefficient. Researchers also group insider 
transactions into categories according to time-specific, firm-specific and event-
specific characteristics to find out at what time, for what firms, or around what 
event is the market more or less efficient. 
In terms of market liquidity, some researchers find that insider trading 
enhances liquidity, at least during stock market crashes. The increase in liquidity is 
not necessarily caused directly by insider trading, but that insider trading increases 
concurrent trading by noise traders and the uninformed traders. Many others find 
that the otherwise is true. Some studies conclude that insider trading can bring too 
much private information to the market, and causes illiquidity. 
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2.2 Review of Insider Trading Literature 
2.2.1 Review of Studies on the U.S. Market 
To examine the profitability of insider trading transactions, Jaffe (1974) 
uses a sample of the 200 large firms listed on the NYSE with at least three insiders 
trading in one direction more than the trading in the opposite direction. The sample 
period is from 1962 to 1968. He finds that over subperiods of 15 months, insiders 
are found to buy before abnormal increases in stock prices and sell before abnormal 
decreases in stock prices. 
Rozeff and Zaman (1988) study insider trading over 1973-1982 of the U.S. 
market, and find that the net of transaction costs (assumed to be 2%) abnormal 
profits to insider trading are about 3%. It is found that outsiders can indeed gain 
from insider trading even after the information of insider trading is published. After 
controlling for size, earnings/price ratio of the firm and transaction cost, the gains 
to outsiders become zero or negative. They also find that higher book-to-market 
value is also associated with more insider purchases. Insider purchases occur more 
often after low stock returns, and occur less often after high stock returns. Finally 
they suggest that the profitability of insider trades in the OTC market and in other 
organized US exchanges are low. 
Lin and Howe (1990) study insider trading of firms listed on the OTC or 
Nasdaq. They use an "intensive trading" criterion to select transactions for 
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analyses. The criterion was first used by Pratt and DeVere (1970), which requires 
that there are at least three insider trading transaction in one direction with no 
trading on the opposite transaction. The sample period of the study is from January 
1975 to April 1983. It is found that abnormal returns are negative after insider sale 
transactions, and are positive after insider purchase transactions. They also find that 
the information content of insider sale is large, while that of insider purchases is 
small. 
While the focus of many studies is to examine the abnormal price 
performance of insider trading on its own, many researchers relate insider trading 
to specific event. 
Based on a sample period of 1967 and 1972, Finnerty (1976) examines the 
relationship between insider trading and the subsequent announcement of a firm's 
financial and accounting results, including future earnings and dividends, and firm 
size. It is found that insider purchases are more significantly positively related to 
small size, large positive future earnings and dividend surprises. 
Penman (1985) examines insider trading activity and disclosure of 
management earnings forecasts. The sample period is 1968-1973 and the sample 
contains 550 firms. It is found that insiders earn abnormal returns by timing their 
trades relative to firms' earnings forecast announcements. By constructing 
portfolios ranked by 3-day excess return around announcement, it is found that 
portfolios with larger insider purchases or smaller insider sales before forecast 
announcement earn the highest excess return. 
13 
Elliott, Morse and Richardson (1984) study the relationship between insider 
trading and information announcements around several events including mergers, 
bankruptcies, changes in annual earnings, dividends and bond rating. The sample 
contains NYSE and AMEX listed firms which have insider trading during 1975-
1979. It is found that insider trades are more likely to be related to wealth changes, 
portfolio diversification, consumption opportunities, and taxes. The results show 
that only insider trading in small firms are likely to be initiated by information, and 
these tradings occur around unexpected changes in earnings. 
Karpoff and Lee (1991) find evidence that insiders tend to sell before 
announcements. Their sample covers all offerings of common stock, straight debt, 
and convertible debt made during 1972-1982. 360 firms listed in CRSP is selected 
randomly. Since insider trading data is not available before 1975, a sample of 223 
new issues between 1975 and 1982 is left. The final clean (only one type of issue 
and with insider trading reported) sample contains 179 primary security issues from 
1975-1982. It is found that insiders sell more shares before they buy prior to the 
month of the announcements. The cumulative mean abnormal numbers of net 
sellers during the period 11 to 0 months prior to announcement of new issue of 
common stocks is 3.415 (significant at 5%), 3.411 (significant at 5%) for 
convertible debt, and -0.696 for straight debt. The result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the expected net gains to insider trades before issues of common 
stock or convertible debt are larger than those of straight debt. 
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Insider trading around dividend announcements is studied by John and Lang 
(1991). The sample period is 1975-85. They construct a model to test the 
interaction of the signals of insider trading and dividend announcements. It is found 
that outsiders consider the two signals together. Insider trading prior to the 
announcement has significant explanatory power in stock returns. Firms with 
insider sales prior to the announcement have negative and significantly lower 
excess return, while firms without any insider transactions or with only insider 
purchases show higher excess return. 
Kahle (2000) examines insider trading around new security issues and finds 
increases in insider sales and decreases in insider purchases before issues of 
convertible debt and equity (information-sensitive securities) in industrial firms, 
but not in utilities firms. The relation between insider trading and stock returns 
after the issues are examined. It is found that managers' sales before the issues are 
more likely to be motivated by overvaluation although this is not the motivation 
behind all equity issues. The industrial firms which had unusual insider selling 
activities perform poorly in the long-run, whereas those which had unusual insider 
buying do not show poor performance. This provides support to the hypothesis that 
more equities are issued by managers when stocks are overvalued. The study also 
provides evidence that insiders time their trades. 
A brief summary of the findings of Investment Intelligence from Insider 
Trading (1998) by H. Nejat Seyhun is included since it serves as a basic reference 
for the present study. 
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In Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading by Seyhun (1998), insider 
trading that occurred in the U.S. during 1975-1995 (approximately 21 years) is 
examined extensively. It is found that 65% to 80% of US listed companies reported 
at least one insider open market transactions every year, and there were two 
aggregate buying cycles and two aggregate insider trading activities. These cycles 
are responsive to macroeconomic conditions. Insider trading patterns also are found 
to be specific for individual firms. Seyhun groups the sample firms by market value 
of equity, and finds that insiders account for 2% of the trading volume in small 
firms (market value of less than 25 million US dollar), and decrease to about 0.5% 
in large firms. Insiders are found to concentrate their trades in certain months: 
insider buys are concentrated in the last quarter of the year, with most buys in 
October, then in December. Insider purchases are least likely to occur in the 
summer. It is suggested that the "seasonal pattern of insider trading is consistent 
with the seasonal pattern in stock prices", and insiders trade to take advantage of 
the seasonal stock price pattern. In September and October, insider purchases are 
relatively more frequent after stock price decreases. The most intensive insider 
purchase period is just before the large stock price surges in January, which is 
consistent with the January effect. 
Seyhun finds that when the sample firms are grouped by firm size, insiders 
of large firms tend to sell twice as often as to buy, whereas there are four insider 
buys for every three insider sales in smaller firms. It is reported that insiders tend to 
carry out purchases in smaller volumes, while insider sales are more likely to be in 
16 
larger lots. Seyhun suggests that insiders tend to break up buys to avoid regulatory 
sanctions. There is no immediate reaction to insider transactions. It is suggested 
that this proves that "insiders do not exploit the upcoming corporate 
announcements as a basis for their transactions. Instead, insiders appear to use their 
long-term expectations of the prospects for their firms". 
In Seyhun's insider trading sample data, insider trading activity is found to 
be positively correlated over time (i.e., buy is followed by buy, and sell is followed 
by sell). It is suggested that "insiders respond to common information signals that 
change slowly over time". 
In terms of the effect of insider trading regulations on the U.S. stock 
market, Seyhun (1998) finds that insider trading sanctions during the 1980s have no 
significant effects on the level of insider trading activity. Over the period 1980 to 
1995, there are actually increasing amounts of insider selling. Neither the 
profitability nor the volume of insider trading is affected by the increased insider 
trading sanctions in the U.S.. Seyhun suggests that the enforcement of insider 
trading regulations tends to benefit small, liquidity-concerned investors only, while 
large, governance-motivated investors suffer from the legislation. 
It is not until more recently that insider trading in the non-U.S. stock 
markets are examined more widely. The following is a summary of the studies on 
insider trading in the European markets, Canadian market, and other emerging 
markets. 
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2.2.2 Review of Studies on the European and Canadian Markets 
Unlike the US market, the Oslo Stock Exchange consists of firms which are 
relatively more closely held. Eckbo and Smith (1998) study insider trading of the 
Exchange between 1985 and 1992. During that period, the authors find either zero 
or negative abnormal returns of the insider buy portfolio. There is also evidence 
suggesting the inferior performance of insider portfolio to the average mutual fund. 
The effect of insider trading restrictions on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
is examined by Kabir and Vermaelen (1996). In 1987, insiders are restricted from 
trading stocks of their own firms 2 months prior to annual earnings announcement. 
It is found that the liquidity, measured in terms of trading volume, is reduced by the 
restriction. The researchers also found that the restriction slows down the speed of 
market adjustment to positive earnings news. 
Masse, Hanrahan and Kushner (1988) examine insider trading around 
announcements of mergers and acquisitions in the Canadian stock market. The 
sample contains 59 firms listed on the Canadian exchanges which have merger and 
acquisition announcements between January 1984 and March 1986. It is concluded 
that insiders trade with private information, and that firms with the largest 
abnormal returns are those which have above normal trading volume. 
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2.2.3 Review of Studies on the Emerging Stock Markets 
Bhattacharya, Dauok, Jorgenson, and Kehr (2000) suggest that unusual 
movements in the returns, volatility of returns, volume of trade and bid-ask spreads 
prior to corporate announcement are not found in the emerging markets, where 
insider trading restrictions are not yet developed. They examine the Bolsa 
Mexicana de Valores listed stocks which had corporate news announcement from 
July 1994 to June 1997, and find no unusualness about these stocks around the 
announcements. The lead-lag relationship between shares traded in segmented 
markets is examined and it is shown that information is fully reflected in prices 
before public release of corporate announcement because of the absence of insider 
trading restriction. 
The study by Wong et. al (2000) is based on a sample of 269 Hong Kong 
firms, which includes 2,135 insider purchases and 1,550 insider sales. The sample 
period of their study is from September 1991 to June 1993. They filter transaction 
records according to the intensive event criterion, with which only consecutive 
buys (or sells) within a ten-day period without opposing transactions are 
considered. They use an event study approach in their study, and define the event 
window as the 30 days surrounding the insider transaction day. Daily excess return 
is calculated by daily stock return minus daily return for the Hang Seng Index. It is 
found that abnormal profits are concentrated in small firms only, and the abnormal 
profit is highest for the large transaction involving small firms. They also find that 
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cumulative abnormal returns for transaction involving medium-sized and large 
firms are small or even insignificantly negative. It is concluded that the Hong Kong 




INSIDER TRADING REGULATION IN HONG KONG 
3.1 Backgrounds: Arguments For and Against Insider Trading 
The issue of whether insider trading should be regulated have generated 
much debate since the earliest time. Below is a summary of some arguments or 
justifications for and against insider trading restriction or regulation presented in 
Easterbrook and Fischel (1991)，Macey (1991), Arshadi and Eyssell, (1993), and 
Gilligan (1999)，and etc. 
For many people, insider trading is thought to be morally wrong and 
dishonest. Insider trading is unfair to the shareholders since the insiders do not 
deserve the gain from such trading. The gains should belong to the shareholders 
instead. The information used by insiders is not "intended for private use". 
However, if managers can maximize wealth of the firm by using the information to 
trade, then shareholders are made better off if insiders are allowed to trade. In this 
case, insider trading is then not "unfair". 
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Some suggests that insider trading causes the problem of moral hazards. In 
some cases, shareholders' interest and managers' interest may not converge. 
Insiders may increase the volatility of the firm's stock price so that they can benefit 
from insider trading; however, this is not to the benefit of shareholders. Insiders 
may also disseminate false information and manipulate stock price for their own 
interest if insider trading is allowed. In the worst case, managers may feel 
indifferent between running the firm prosperous and making the firm bankrupt. 
Stronger views against insider trading include that trading on information 
by insiders are actually considered a form of theft if the information is believed not 
to be the property of the insiders. Also, corporate managers and executives know 
more intimately about the business of the firm than any others because of their job 
nature, and these individuals are the first to know the information. Such 
information about the firm is very often confidential. Trading based on these 
information by insiders is an abuse of position and abuse of confidential 
information. Also, it is suggested and found in many reports and studies that insider 
trading undermines public and international confidence in the effectiveness and 
integrity of the securities markets. Many people advocate that integrity of the stock 
markets must be maintained and promoted so that their market can stay competitive 
among others markets. 
Insider trading is criminalized in some parts of the world, but not so in 
Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, the main provisions relating to insider trading are 
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contained in the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance, and the Securities 
(Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance. The two ordinances will be reviewed briefly. 
3.2 The Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance 
The Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance (“SIDO”) was implemented on 
September 1，1991 to replace the then existing provisions of the Securities 
Ordinance. The purpose of the current legislation is to ensure a “level playing field" 
for all participants in the market, so that no one is allowed to benefit from trading 
firm's security by making use of undisclosed private information of the firm. 
In essence, insider dealing occurs when a person or corporation, either 
directly or indirectly connected to a listed corporation, uses relevant information of 
that corporation to deal in the securities or their derivatives of that corporation, or 
to counsel or procure any other person to trade the securities or their derivatives. 
Relevant information is defined as specific information which is not generally 
known to investors who might deal in the securities concerned, and is likely to 
materially affect the price of those securities. 
Exemptions to insider dealing include the acquisition of qualification shares 
by directors, the bona fide performance of an underwriting agreement, the bona fide 
exercise of the duties as liquidator, receiver or trustee in bankruptcy. Also, a person 
is not an insider dealer if he/she can prove that he/she enters into the transaction but 
is with no view to the making of a profit or the avoiding of a loss, whether for 
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him/herself or others. A person who enters into a transaction as an agent for 
another, but does not select or advice on the selection of the securities to which the 
transaction relates, is also not an insider dealer. 
While insider dealing is not a criminal offence in Hong Kong, The Insider 
Dealing Tribunal (the Tribunal) is empowered to inquire into insider dealing cases 
and to impose orders to penalize insider dealers. A person who is identified as an 
insider dealer may be prohibited from being a director, liquidator, receiver or 
manager of a company for a period not exceeding five years, required to pay to the 
Government an amount not exceeding the profit made or the loss avoided relating 
to the insider dealing, and/or penalized for an amount of up to three times the profit 
made or the loss avoided as a result of the insider dealing. Any persons who 
contravene the investigation or the orders made by the Tribunal may be liable to a 
fine of up to $200,000 and to imprisonment for one year. 
3.3 The Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance 
The Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance ("SDIO") was also 
enacted on September 1, 1991. The Ordinance aims to assure a fair, orderly, and 
transparent security market, such that data on shareholdings of listed corporations, 
which are relevant to the public in making investing decisions, are to be 
disseminated to the investors in an accurate and timely manner. 
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The SDIO requires the disclosure of interests for substantial shareholders, 
directors, and chief executives of a corporation. The Ordinance is applicable to 
interests in all companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong ("SEHK"), 
regardless of where the companies are incorporated. 
A substantial shareholder is defined as anyone holding at least 10% of the 
share capital of a corporation listed on the SEHK. Substantial shareholders are 
under the obligation of disclosure whenever there is a change in their 
shareholdings, which is rounded down to more than 1%. 
Under the SDIO, directors and chief executives of corporations face a more 
stringent requirement than substantial shareholders. Directors and chief executives 
of a listed company are obligated to declare any interest in shares or debentures in 
the listed company or any associated corporation, and their acquisition or disposal. 
Any shares or debentures in which the spouse or any child under the age of 18 of 
directors and chief executives are interested are also taken to be interests of the 
directors or chief executives. 
Also, when two or more persons enter into an agreement which includes the 
provision to acquire shares of a particular company (a target company), the two or 
more person involved are under the duty of disclosure. 
In addition to the requirement to disclose interests held by family members, 
interests held through a corporation, which is related to the substantial 
shareholders, directors and chief executives, are also subject to the disclosure 
requirement. A person is taken to be interested in shares if a corporation is 
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interested in them if that corporation is under that person's direction or instructions, 
or if the person is entitled to one-third or more voting power (effective voting 
powers) of that corporation. 
When disclosure is required, the SDIO requires the notification to be made 
within the period of five days following the day on which the duty to disclosure 
arose. The notification must be made in writing to the Stock Exchange and the 
listed company concerned, and arrangement must be made to ensure that the 
notification must be received by the Exchange before it is received by the listed 
company. If the listed company concerned is an authorized financial institution, the 
company is also required to notify the Monetary Authority on the next day 
following it received notification. The notification must specify the share capital to 
which it relates, the number of shares held by the person immediately after the time 
when the disclosure duty arises, the identity of each registered holder of the shares 
which the notification relates, and the number of those shares held by each 
registered holder. 
Failure to comply with the SDIO is a criminal offence. If a listed company 
is in default in complying with the Ordinance, every officer concerned is liable to a 
fine of $2,000, and in the case of continuing offence, to a further fine of $200 per 
day on each day the offence continues. An individual who fails to make a timely 
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notification, or makes a notification which is false in material particular is subject 
to a fine of up to $100,000 and to imprisonment of up to two years. ^ 
“For details, please refer to the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance, Cap. 395, and the Securities 
(Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance, Cap. 396. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Data 
As described in the previous section, directors, and chief executives of a 
listed company are under the obligation to disclose any interests in the listed 
company, as well as the acquisitions and disposals of such interests. Information on 
each notification received by the Stock Exchange is disseminated to the general 
public through The Securities (Disclosure of Interests) ("SDI") Daily Summaries 一 
Directors'/Chief Executives’ Notifications Report published by the Hong Kong 
Exchanges and Clearing Limited ("HKEX"). In the past, the SDI was published by 
the SEHK once every two weeks. Information in the SDI includes the company 
name, the name of the insider, the type of securities, transaction date, reporting 
date, and publication date. Recently, the Stock Exchange has made the SDI 
available for public access on the Exchange's homepage. The SDI database allows 
the public to retrieve SDI of the most current two months on the Exchange's 
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homepage. The SDI on paper and the SDI on the internet nowadays are identical in 
content. However, compared to the past, the SDI is now published on every trading 
day. In some cases, there is only a two-day time lag between the insider transaction 
date and the day on which the transaction record is shown in the SDI daily 
summary on the internet. 
Data on the trading activities of corporate insiders� used in this study are 
obtained from InsideTrade Asia ("ITA") of PRIM ARK-DISCLOSURE. The ITA 
data are compiled based on the original Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Daily 
Summaries - Directors，/Chief Executives' Notifications Report published by the 
HKEX. 
The time period of this study is January 1993 through December 1998. For 
the purpose of this study, each observation of insider trading record of the ITA 
version of SDI includes the company name, the company stock code assigned by 
the Stock Exchange, the name of the director or chief executive who traded as 
reported by the company, the transaction type, the security holdings before and 
after the transaction, the date of transaction, the transaction price. In order to 
measure returns to insider transaction, only open market purchases and open 
market sales, which are represented by the transaction type "P" and "S" 
respectively in ITA, are included for analyses in this study. 
3 Directors or chief executives of a corporation listed in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. 
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There are many possible reasons behind an insider transaction. For insider 
sales, the insider may sell stocks of the company for liquidity reasons. He/she may 
also sell to diversify risk of his/her investment. In terms of insider purchases, they 
can occur naturally when directors and chief executives buy shares for qualification 
purposes. Also, the insiders may acquire shares because they are exercising share 
options. Besides the reasons listed above, many researchers and the general public 
think that private information is the main reason behind insider transactions. 
Directors and chief executives are generally more informed and more promptly 
informed of the business prospects of the companies than the public. If directors 
and chief executives are allowed to trade the securities of their own companies, it is 
very likely that they trade stocks of their own firms' to make profit or to avoid loss 
as soon as good news or bad news of the firm reach them. Even though insider 
trading is restricted or even illegal in many circumstances, insiders are still likely to 
trade based on information. 
Since in general, it is more likely that insider purchases are driven by 
information than insider sales, insider purchase should be a stronger information 
signal than insider sale. Therefore in most of the studies on insider trading, insider 
purchases and insider sales are examined separately. This method is also used in 
the present study. 
It is possible that a single insider transaction is reported more than once to 
the SEHK. One possibility is that it is a single transaction that involves only one 
director, but the transaction is reported to the SEHK by different individuals. 
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Another possibility is that it is a transaction that involves multiple directors, and all 
the individual directors involved in the transaction are required to report that 
transaction. Exact duplicate insider trading records are not found in the original 
ITA dataset. Suspected records, which usually have very similar company names 
or director names, are examined individually. Thorough verification and clean-up 
procedures are performed to minimize the number of duplicate entries in the insider 
trading dataset used in this study. For the case that a single transaction on a single 
day involves two or more directors, which may be represented by two or more 
entries in the original dataset, the entries are retained separate and are not 
aggregated or consolidated. The entries of this type of transaction usually carry 
identical information in all fields except for the field of director name. In order to 
determine whether or not entries like these factually represent a single transaction 
by multiple directors or they represent multiple transactions by different directors, 
we will need to match those transactions with a database which contains all the 
names of director and chief executive for all firms, exact past and current joint 
shareholdings information, and possibly the relationship among directors in 
individual firms. Since we do not have this database available on hand, and to build 
such a database will require an enormous amount of efforts and time, this issue is 
not addressed in the present study, but is left for more extensive research in the 
future. Also, whether or not transactions of this type should be regarded as a single 
4 Mr Robert Halili of the PRIMARK-ASIASCORES confirms that the original ITA dataset contains 
"double trades" because ITA is based on the SDI records published by the Stock Exchange. The 
double trades are the same trades under different directors which represent the same holdings. 
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transaction depends on the objective of the study. Keeping the original record as 
separate transactions may possibly cause discrepancies between summary statistics 
on Hong Kong directors' dealings reported in other papers and the summary 
statistics presented in this paper. However, it does not make the findings in the 
study less reliable. 
Data on daily cash-dividend-adjusted stock returns (daily stock return) and 
daily value-weighted cash-dividend-adjusted market returns are obtained from the 
Pacific-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) Databases compiled by the University of 
Rhode Island. In this study, only the PACAP Hong Kong database is used. For each 
firm with insider trading, selected elements from financial statement and income 
statement are also obtained from PACAP. These elements include the number of 
common stock outstanding at fiscal year end, total stockholders' equity, and net 
income. Other general information such as industry type, daily trading volume in 
shares, daily closing price of common stock, month-end common stock closing 
price, month-end number of common stock outstanding, and month-end market 
value of stocks also collected. 
Some of the sample firms' nature of business had changed during the 
sample period. Under the classification by the SEHK, these firms belonged to 
different industry groups across the sample period. In order to trace the industry 
classification of the firm for each insider trading record in the sample, industry 
classification data is collected form various issues of the SEHK Monthly Bulletin. 
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A complete trading day calendar for the sample period is compiled by 
combining trading calendars published in various issues of Stock Exchange Fact 
Book. Sometimes on the actual SDI report, individuals would report that they had 
traded on a non-trading day. Subsequently the entry on IT A dataset would carry the 
original transaction date as found in the SDI report. In this study, the transaction 
date of each of these cases will be considered as the next immediate trading date 
following the transaction date reported. The transaction date adjustment is made for 
the procedure and purpose of this study, which includes abnormal return 
calculations. The assumption is that individuals might trade based on information. 
If the SDI was correct, and the individual had truly made the transaction on a non-
trading day, the individual might do so because the information was received after 
the market closed, but for some reason, the individual did not wait until the next 
trading day to carry out the transaction. With this assumption, it is not as justified 
to correct the transaction date to the trading day before the original reported 
transaction date since it is possible that the individual had not yet received the 
information. 
Daily All Ordinary Index (AOI) Sectorial Indices during the period of 
December 1992 to January 1999 are collected from the DATASTREAM. The 
Sectorial Indices are on the sectors of finance, utilities, properties, consolidated 
enterprises, industrials, and hotels. The data are used in the analyses of aggregate 
industry-wide insider trading activities for each industry. Detailed procedures will 
be presented later in the paper. 
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4.2 Statistics on Insider Trading Samples 
4.2.1 Statistics on Entire Sample 
After combining the ITA insider trading data, the PACAP data, the industry 
classification data, and the trading day calendar, the total number of open market 
insider transactions is 23,675. Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the insider 
trading data used in the study.^ The insider trading dataset includes open market 
purchases and open market sales transaction records by directors and chief 
executives only. In the sample, 541 companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (SEHK) were involved in insider trading during the period of January 
1993 to December 1998. The total number of open market purchases transactions 
and that of open market sales transactions is 16,221 and 7,574 respectively. The 
number of firms involved in open market purchases and open market sales is 507 
and 458 respectively. In general, there are more insider purchases than insider 
sales. The ratio of insider purchases to insider sales is about 2.15, such that two out 
of three insider transactions are purchases. 
5 Summary statistics are calculated based on the dataset used in this paper. 
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For the entire sample, the average number of shares traded per transaction is 
5,136,724, and on average, the value of shares traded in each transaction is 
$11,487,213. A comparison by type of transaction shows that both the average 
number of shares per transaction and the average value of the shares traded per 
transaction are larger for sales transactions than that for purchases transactions. 
Seyhun (1998) also finds that insiders in the U.S. are likely to break up purchases 
into smaller transactions for fear of insider trading sanctions. He suggests that 
insider purchase provides a stronger signal than insider sale does to both the 
authority and the general public. On the other hand, insiders are not as concerned 
with insider trading regulations in sales transactions. It might seem to the authority 
that the motivations behind insider sales are less obvious. Apart from selling based 
on private information, the insiders might sell for liquidity. 
4.2.2 Statistics by Year of Transaction 
Table 2 shows the frequency distribution of director trading by year of 
transaction. There is an increasing trend of the number of insider purchases over the 
period from 1995 to 1998, while the number of insider sales stays relatively stable 
over this period, except for the year 1997, during which a market crash occurred. In 
the sample, the number of insider transaction is relatively large for the year 1994. It 
can be seen that the number of purchases for that year almost triples that for the 
year 1995. There are several possible explanations for this. One is that it simply 
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reflects that directors and chief executives were indeed relatively enthusiastic about 
purchasing shares of their company in that year. Another explanation is that 
insiders tended to break large purchases into smaller ones in that year. However, it 
is also possible that there were a lot of duplicated reporting, and/or single purchases 
which involved multiple directors in that year. Table 3 shows the value of shares 
traded by year. This table is compiled from data extracted from Yearly Statistics: 
(Directors Dealings) by ITA-DISCLOSURE Inc. Values of the shares traded 
shown in the table are restricted to open market purchases and open market sales 
transactions. Double trades, that is, the same trades under different directors which 
represent the same holdings, are counted once only. It can be seen that for the year 
1994, the market value of the shares traded in insider purchases was indeed larger 
than that for 1995. The difference is approximately $3,790 million dollars. With 
reference to statistics in Table 3, it is justified to say that the large number of 
purchases in 1994 is unlikely to be contributed by duplicated reporting or double 
trades alone. 
In terms of the number of firms with insider transaction, we see that for 
almost every year in the sample period, there are more firms with insider purchases 
than firms with insider sales. 
With its relatively large size, it is possible that the insider trading sample 
can be divided into sub-samples based on different attributes of individual 
transactions without having too few observations in each sub-sample. The entire 
insider trading sample will be examined according to 1) month of the year in which 
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the transaction occurred; 2) day of the week on which the transaction occurred; 3) 
the industry classification of the transaction firm; 4) the size of the transaction firm; 
5) the book-to-market ratio of the transaction firm; 6) the price-earnings ratio of the 
transaction firm; 7) the relative trading volume of the transaction in number of 
shares; and 8) the size of the transaction firm and the relative trading volume of the 
transaction in number of shares together. 
4.2.3 Statistics by Calendar Month of Transaction 
Table 4 shows the sample frequency distribution of insider trading events 
by calendar month of year. In terms of all the transactions, it can be seen that 
insiders tend to both buy and sell more in October. In terms of purchases 
transaction only, the second most intensive insider buying month is January. This 
statistic is consistent with the so-called January effect, when the daily rates of 
return of common stocks are unusually high in January.^ Relatively intensive 
buying among insiders in January suggests that insiders do consider January a 
month with higher than usual profit opportunity. In some studies, it is found that 
the January effect is concentrated in the stocks of small firms (Reinganum, 1983). 
Table 5 shows the frequency distribution of insider trading events in January by 
firm size and type of transaction. It is found that insider purchases are more likely 
6 Keane (1983) suggests that the January effect seems to occur in the first five trading days of 
January. 
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to be found in small firms. The profitability of purchases by small firms made in 
January will be examined in the next section. Compared to other months of the 
year, insider trading is least likely to occur in March and April. 
4.2.4 Statistics by Day of the Week of Transaction 
Table 6 shows the frequency distribution of insider trading events by day of 
week. Insider trading is most likely to take place on Monday. The frequency of 
purchase is higher relatively to other day of the week. The difference between the 
number of purchases on Monday, the day with the most insider purchases, and that 
on Wednesday, the day with the least insider purchases, is 484, or approximately 
14%. One explanation is the “weekend effect". The weekend effect is similar to the 
January effect stated previously. The weekend effect refers to the phenomenon of 
systematic fall in the rate of return on some stocks during the weekend (see in 
Cuthbertson, 1996，p. 170). Like the case of the January effect, insiders might 
simply consider that buying on Monday provides higher than usual profits/ 
7 In Cuthbertson (1996), it is pointed out the weekend effect can be caused by the fact that firms and 
governments tend to release good news some time between Monday and Friday, but they tend to 
release bad news during the weekend. Therefore, the bad news is reflected on the price drops on 
Monday. 
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4.2.5 Statistics by Industry Classification of the Firm 
Every company listed on the SEHK is assigned with an industry 
classification by the Exchange. Table 7 shows the frequency distribution of insider 
trading activity by industry classification. The number of companies in each 
particular industry classification as in end of January 1998 is included in the Table 
for reference. The ratio of purchases to sales is the largest for the hotels industry 
group. Directors and executives of consolidated enterprises are the most intensive 
sellers of their companies' stocks, while insiders of the properties group are the 
most intensive buyers. Overall, relative to the insiders of other industries, corporate 
insiders of the properties industry are the most active in trading stocks of their own 
firms. 
4.2.6 Statistics by Size of the Firm 
Table 8 shows the frequency distribution of insider trading activities by firm 
g 
size. Rozeff and Zaman (1988) argue that firm size is a contributing factor to the 
abnormal returns to outside investors. In a study by Wong et. al (2000), it is found 
^Small firms are firms with market capitalization less than or equal to HK$618 million. Medium-
sized firms are firms with market capitalization between HK$618 and HK$1991 million. Large 
firms are firms with market capitalization larger than HK$1991 million. 
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that the abnormal return to insider trading in Hong Kong is significantly different 
for firms of different sizes (and relative trading volume). ^  
Statistics show that insider purchases are more commonly found among 
small size firms. The ratio of purchases to sales for the small firm size group is 
3.232. On the other hand, directors in large firms are more likely to sell. The ratio 
of purchases to sales for the large firm size group is 1.605. Since the firm size data 
is not available for all events, the total number of transactions does not add up to 
the figures shown in Table 2. 
4.2.7 Statistics by Book-to-Market Ratio of the Firm 
Fama and French (1995) argue that growth stocks are typically associated 
with low book-to-market ratio, whereas value stocks are typically associated with 
high book-to-market ratio. Since high book-to-market ratio signifies that a stock is 
undervalued and positive future returns, while low book-to-market ratio indicates 
over-valuation and negative future returns of a stock, it is likely that insiders 
purchase more when the stock's book-to-market ratio is high and sell more when 
the stocks' book-to-market ratio is low (Seyhun, 1998)i�. Each transaction is 
ranked by book-to-market ratio of the stock concerned and is assigned into the 
9 The study by Wong et. al (2000) is based on a sample a 269 firms, of 2135 insider purchases and 
1550 insider sales. The sample period of their study is from September 1991 to June 1993. 
Seyhun (1998) gives a detail explanation of the relationship between book-to-market ratio to 
insider trading activity, and analyzed empirically the relationship between the two. 
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three groups: low book-to-market ratio group, medium book-to-market ratio group, 
and high book-to-market ratio group 
Statistics in table 9 are consistent with the hypothesis stated previously. 
There are far more purchases among the high book-to-market ratio group than 
among the low book-to-market ratio group. Insider purchases increase in frequency 
with increasing book-to-market ratio, while insider sales decrease in frequency with 
increasing book-to-market ratio. This is consistent with the findings in Rozeff and 
Zaman (1998). In the sample, the ratio of purchases-to-sales is 4.052 for the high 
book-to-market ratio group, while it is 1.061 for the low book-to-market ratio 
group. 
4.2.8 Statistics by Price-Earnings Ratio of the Firm 
Price-Earnings ratio of a firm is another widely used indicator of future 
stock returns. High P/E ratios is an indicator of low future stock returns, while low 
P/E ratios is an indictor of high future returns. As indicated in the section about 
book-to-market ratio, value firms are typically associated with low (P/E) ratios, 
while growth firms are typically associated with high price-earning (P/E) ratios. 
Therefore, it is be reasonable to assume that insiders are more likely to buy shares 
11 Low book-to-market ratio is a book-to-market ratio of less than or equal to 0.580. Medium book-
to-market ratio is a book-to-market ratio of between 0.580 and 1.282. High book-to-market ratio is a 
book-to-market ratio of larger than 1.282. 
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of their own company when the P/E of the stock is low, while on the other hand, 
insiders are more likely to sell when P/E of the stock of their company is high. 
Similar to the previous sections, each transaction is ranked by price-
earnings ratio of the stock concerned and is assigned into the three groups: low 
price-earnings ratio group, medium price-earnings ratio group, and high price-
earnings ratio group. 12 
Table 10 shows the frequency distribution of insider trading activity by 
price-earnings ratio of the firm concerned. The statistics are consistent with the 
assumptions made regarding the relationship between price-earnings ratio and 
insider trading activity. On one hand, insider purchases are more frequent in the 
low price-earnings ratio group, while fewer sales are found. On the other hand, 
insider sales are more prominent in the high price-earnings ratio group, while fewer 
purchases are found. The ratio of purchases to sales for the low price-earnings ratio 
group is 2.566, while that for the high price-earnings ratio group is 1.307. 
4.2.9 Statistics by Relative Trading Volume in Shares 
Trading volume is found to be positively associated with the quality of 
information (see Karpoff (1987) for example). Wong et. al (2000) suggests that the 
trading volume of individual transactions affects the post-event abnormal stock 
12 
Low price-earnings ratio is a price-earnings ratio of less than or equal to 7.88. Medium price-
eamings ratio is a price-earnings ratio between 7.88 and 15.11. High price-earnings ratio is a price-
eamings ratio of larger than 15.11. 
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prices. Similar to Wong et. al (2000) and other studies, relative trading volume is 
calculated by the total number of shares traded in the insider transaction divided by 
total number of outstanding shares of the stock. Relative trading volume is used as 
an indicator of the quality of information associated with insider trading. 
Each transaction is ranked by relative trading volume in share and is 
assigned into the three groups: low relative trading volume ratio group, medium 
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relative trading volume group, and high relative trading volume group. 
Table 11 shows frequency distribution of insider transaction by relative 
trading volume in share. As discussed before, insiders might tend to sell in larger 
lots, and buy in smaller lots. This pattern is indeed found in the sample. The ratio of 
purchases to sales is 2.357 for smaller trades while that ratio is 1.828 for larger 
trades. 
As it is found in Wong et. al (2000), for example, that the abnormal price 
performance in stock price is most significant in transactions of large relative 
trading volume which involve small firms, it may also be interesting to see the 
interactive effect between firm size and relative trading volume in this paper. 
13 Small relative trading volume is a relative trading volume of less than or equal to 0.0000181%. 
Medium relative trading volume is a relative trading volume between 0.000181% and 0.0000898%. 
Large relative trading volume is a relative trading volume of larger than 0.0000898%. 
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4.2.10 Statistics by Firm Size and Relative Trading Volume in Shares 
The frequency distribution of insider trading activities by firm size and 
relative trading volume is presented in Table 12. More medium to large relative 
trading volume purchases are found in small firms, while small relative trading 
volume purchases and sales are more common among larger firms. This is 
reasonable since the dollar value for large transactions in small firms is also 
smaller. Large transactions in large firms, on the other hand, involve a very large 
amount of capital. It is more likely that a transaction involving a large amount of 
money will be broken into smaller transactions. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Measurement of Stock Price Performance for Insider Trading Events 
An event study methodology is applied to examine the short-run and long-
run profitability of insiders from buying or selling stocks of their own firms. Stated 
formerly, one main assumption behind insider trading activity is that insiders buy 
and sell stocks of their firms because insiders have private information. However, it 
is still very possible that insiders trade due to other reasons. Jaffe (1974) suggests 
that information can initiate simultaneous buying and selling activities by insiders 
of the same firm. During these periods when insiders of a firm trade intensively, 
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more of these insiders are more likely to have information. Similar to many 
previous studies (see Jaffe (1974), Lin and Howe (1990), and etc.), to reduce noises 
from trades not initiated by private information, we will select a sample based on 
an intensive trading criterion. 
In this study, a firm with at least 3 times more purchases than sales in a 
month is classified as an intensive buying firm for that month. Conversely, a firm 
with at least 3 times more sales than purchases in a month is classified as an 
intensive selling firm for the month. The intensive trading event sample includes all 
transactions of the intensive trading firms in the period of January 1993 to 
December 1998. 
In event time, day 0 is the transaction date of an "intensive" trading event. 
An estimation period from day -280 to day -21 is used to calculate the parameters, 
Oj and Pj of the market model: 
where Rjt is the daily dividend-adjusted stock return for firm j on day t. Rmt is the 
daily value-weighted dividend-adjusted market return on day t. ccj is the estimated 
intercept. Pj is the estimated market risk of the stock j. Ep is the error term on day t, 
which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance 
of. 
The abnormal return to firm j on day t, ARjt, is then calculated from day -20 




where a and P are the estimates of a and p . The average abnormal return 
J j J J 
(AAR) across firms for each day is: 
V八 
where N is the number of firms with insider trading on day t. 
The significance of average abnormal return is tested by the statistic: 
矿 碰 ⑷ 
^ AAR, 
The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) to the insider trading 
firms from day —D to day D is the sum of average abnormal returns between day -
D and day D. The formula is: 
D 
CAAR^ = ^AAR^ , (5) 
t=-D 
and the significance of the cumulative average abnormal return is: 
CAAR^ 
tcAAR, = ( 6 ) 
^CAARt 
Mentioned previously, insiders are required to report to the SEHK of any 
insider transactions within 5 days following the transaction. Here we make the 
prudent assumptions that the average outsiders would not know any occurrence of 
insider trading on day 1 to day 5 after the insider transaction day, and that by day 
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20 after the insider transaction day, the SEHK should have disseminated 
information about the transaction to the public through the SDI report. To assess 
the short-run performance of stocks traded by insiders and the degree of market 
efficiency in the stock market, the cumulative average abnormal returns for post-
event day periods of day 1 to day 5, day 1 to day 10, and day 1 to day 20, are 
presented and compared. We will also examine the longer run performances insider 
traded stocks by considering the post event 30-day, 60-day, 90-day and 180-day 
cumulative average abnormal returns associated with insider purchases and sales.丄斗 
The CAARs will be analyzed in the aggregate, as well as individually by 
transaction year, by calendar month of the year, by day of the week, by industry 
classification of the transaction firm, by size of the transaction firm, by price-
earnings ratio of the transaction firm, by book-to-market ratio of the transaction 
firm, by relative trading volume of the transaction, and by firm size and by relative 
trading volume together/^ If we find persistent abnormal returns after the day on 
which the public is informed of any insider trading, the market is inefficient. Also 
if such abnormal returns exist, it is likely that outsiders can actually earn abnormal 
profits by mimicking the trades of insiders. 
14 The post event 30-day cumulative abnormal returns is the post event day 1 to day 30 cumulative 
abnormal returns, and so on. 
15 Definitions of the by-groups are found in the previous section of this paper "Statistics of the 
Insider Trading Sample". 
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4.3.2 Aggregate Industry-wide Insider Trading Prior to Major Adjustment 
in the AOI Sectorial Index 
Besides evaluating the abnormal stock price performance associated with 
insider trading, some researchers examine more general aspects of insider trading 
activity to investigate the issue of whether insider trading contains information 
content. For example, Seyhun (1998) analyze the intensity of aggregate insider 
buying and selling activity and find that aggregate insider trading intensity predicts 
aggregate stock market movement. The conclusions of Seyhun are 1) stock market 
increases more following a period of aggregate insider net buying than it does 
following a period of aggregate insider net selling, but 2) stock market does not 
actually decline following a period aggregate insider net selling. 
In this study, we will also examine the intensity of aggregate insider buying 
and selling activity during the period of January 1993 to December 1998. To give a 
more detailed analysis, we will study the intensity of insider trading activity by 
individual industries. Again, we will follow the SEHK industry classification in the 
analysis. The main issue that we will investigate is whether aggregate industry-
wide insider trading prior to major industry-wide stock price movements are 
different from those during periods which are not followed by such major 
adjustments. 
The procedures are as follows. For every trading day, a 5-day cumulative 
return is calculated for each of the AOI Sectorial Indices during the period of 
January 1993 to January 1999. If the 5-day cumulative return of an AOI Sectorial 
4 8 
Index is larger than or equal to an absolute amount of 10%, we define it as a major 
adjustment to the stock prices of that particular sector (or industry). We may 
observe three possible situations occur to the industry index within every 5-day 
period: 1) the index adjusts up by at least 10%, 2) the index adjusts down by at 
least 10%, and 3) the index adjusts less than 10%. Within the same calendar month, 
it is possible that the index adjusts up by at least 10% and down by at least 10%. 
For each industry, we categorize the calendar months into four types: 1) a calendar 
month that is not followed by any occurrences of major upward or downward 
adjustment in the index in the next calendar month; 2) a calendar month that is 
followed by the occurrences of major upward adjustments in the index in the next 
calendar month; 3) a calendar month that is followed by the occurrences of major 
downward adjustments in the index in the next calendar month, and 4) a calendar 
month that is followed by both the occurrences of major upward and downward 
adjustments in the index in the next calendar month. 
To study aggregate insider trading activity of an industry, for each industry 
on each calendar month, we will calculate the total number of insider purchase 
transactions, the total number of insider sale transactions, the total number of 
shares bought by insiders, the total number of shares sold by insiders, the 
aggregation of stocks bought by insiders measured by relative trading volume 
(ASHB), and the aggregation of stocks sold by insiders measured by relative 
trading volume (ASHS). Two ratios are constructed. The first ratio is the total 
number of insider purchase transactions divided by the total number of insider sale 
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transactions (the "purchase transaction ratio", FREQBS). The second ratio is the 
total number of shares bought by insiders divided by the total number of shares 
sold by insiders (the "purchase share ratio", SHBS). 
To investigate whether insiders of an industry can predict one calendar 
month ahead of any major industry-wide stock price adjustments during the next 
calendar month and trade accordingly, for each industry, we will compare the 
average "purchase transaction ratio" (FREQBS), the average "purchase share ratio" 
(SHBS), the average aggregation of stocks bought by insiders (ASHB), and the 
average aggregation of stocks sold by insiders (ASHS) for calendar months which 
are followed by major adjustments in the AOI Sectorial Index in the next calendar 
month with average FREQBS, SHBS, ASHB, and ASHB for months which are not 
followed by and kinds of major adjustments in the next calendar month. If insiders 
of an industry can predict major industry-wide increases in stock prices that occur 
the next calendar month and insiders act accordingly to potentially make profits or 
avoid losses, then for that industry, either or both the average purchase transaction 
ratio and the average purchase share ratio should be higher for calendar months 
ahead of major adjustments than for those months which are not ahead of 
adjustments. The abnormally high ratios can be caused by an increase in the total 
number of purchase transaction and/or a decrease in the total number of sale 
transaction, and an increase in the total number of shares insiders purchased and/or 
a decrease in the total number of shares insiders sold during one calendar month 
ahead of major upward adjustment in the AOI Sectorial Index. Also, we should 
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observe a rise in the average aggregation of shares bought by insiders measured by 
relative trading volume, and a fall in average aggregation of shares bought by 
insiders measured by relative trading volume. Conversely, if insiders of an industry 
can predict major decreases in stock prices one calendar month beforehand and 
these insiders trade accordingly, then either or both average FREQBS and average 
SHBS should be higher for calendar months ahead of major adjustments than for 
those months which are not ahead of adjustments. The abnormally low ratios can 
be caused by a decrease in the total number of purchase transaction and/or an 
increase in the total number of sale transaction, and a decrease in the total number 
of shares insiders purchased and/or an increase in the total number of shares 
insiders sold during one calendar month ahead of major upward adjustment in the 
AOI Sectorial Index. Also, we should observe a fall in the aggregation of shares 
bought by insiders measured by relative trading volume, and a rise in aggregation 
of shares bought by insiders measured by relative trading volume. 
r-tests will be used to test whether the average FREQBS, SHBS, ASHB, 
and ASHS are significantly different for the months followed by major industry-
wide adjustments to the AOI Sectorial Index from those averages for months which 
are not followed by any major adjustments in the Index. 
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
5.1 Stock Price Performance Around Insider Trading Events: 
Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
5.1.1 On the Entire Sample 
Table 13 to table 21 present the event day average abnormal return (AAR) 
for insider purchase and insider sale transactions, and the post-event 5-day, 10-day, 
20-day, 30-day, 60-day, 90-day, and 180-day cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs) following the transactions. The AARs and CAARs for the intensive 
trading samples are shown in the aggregate sample, and also by year, by calendar 
month of the year, by day of the week, by industry classification of the transaction 
firm, by size of the transaction firm, by price-earnings ratio of the transaction firm, 
by book-to-market ratio of the transaction firm, by relative trading volume of the 
transaction, and by firm size and relative trading volume together. The time 
intervals are chosen to study the short-term and long-term predictive ability of 
insiders, and also to examine whether outsiders can gain abnormal profits by 
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following the transactions by insiders. The pre-event day CAARs of the period day 
-20 to day -1，or the -20-day CAARs, are also shown for reference. For simplicity, 
the -20-day CAAR will be called "the pre-event day CAAR" hereafter. To assess 
the short-run and long-run profitability of insider trading, ^-statistics are used to test 
the significance of post-event period CAARs. 
Table 13 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding 
insider purchases and insider sales for the entire sample period of January 1993 to 
December 1998. 
The overall result shows that in the short-run, prices increase after insider 
purchases and decrease after insider sales. In the longer-run however, while prices 
of stocks sold by insiders remain low, prices of stocks bought by insiders also 
drop.i6 
16 In the study by Wong et al. (2000), they find that insider purchases are made after a period of 
stock price increases, and prices continue to go up afterwards. Insider sales are also found to occur 
after a period of stock price increases, but prices drop immediately after the transaction day. The t-
statistics on abnormal returns are found to be more significant in the insider sale sample. 
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For insider purchase transactions, the pre-event CAAR is significantly low, 
which means that insider purchases occur after a period of persistently low and 
decreasing stock price. Therefore, it is likely that insiders do "buy low" in the 
purchases. On day 0, the AAR is still negative, but the number is not significantly 
different from zero. However, the post-event 5-day CAAR is insignificantly 
positive, the post-event 10-day and 20-day CAARs are 0.34% (t = 2.41) and 0.48% 
(t = 2.19) respectively, and are both significantly positive. However, the post-event 
30-day and 60-day CAARs are not significantly different from zero, and the post-
event 90-day and 180-day are significantly negative at -2.54% (t = -3.82) and -
7.53% (t = -4.57). In the aggregate, we see that insider purchased stocks perform 
well within a 20-day period after the transaction, but afterwards, the stocks do not 
perform so well until in the longer-run of a period up to 180 days after the 
transaction. Insider purchases make abnormal profits in the short-run, but not in the 
long-run. Since the CAARs of insider purchases are significantly positive only 
within a 20-day period after the transaction, and the CAARs become significantly 
negative afterwards for a relatively long period, it might be very difficult for 
outsiders to mimic insider purchases and make abnormal profits after they know 
the occurrence of insider purchases. 
Price movements around insider sale transactions are more dramatic. The 
pre-event CAAR is significantly positive, and insiders are very likely to be able to 
"sell high" in the transactions. While the AAR for day 0 is 0.74% (t = 8.85), all the 
post-event CAARs are significantly negative. The post-event 5-day CAAR is -
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1.08% (t = -7.66), and by 20 days after the transaction, the CAAR is -3.91% (t =-
12.27). The longer the post-event period is considered, the more negative the 
CAARs become. The 180-day CAAR is as low as -24.87% (t = -12.41). The results 
suggest that stocks sold by insiders perform indeed poorly after the transaction both 
in the short-run and the in long-run, and insiders can make profits (or avoid losses) 
when they sell into transactions to sell stocks of their own firms. Since the CAARs 
exist in a prolonged period, it is also very likely that outsiders who sell stocks 
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following insiders can make abnormal profits. 
When insider trading of the Hong Kong stock market is examined in the 
aggregate sense, contrary to the widespread belief that corporate insiders are 
making huge profits from their insider purchase transactions, we find that this is not 
the case. The result shows that in the aggregate, although insiders are able to earn 
abnormal profits from both insider buying and selling activities in the short-run, the 
magnitude of short-run abnormal profits associated with insider sales is 
considerably larger than that associated with insider purchases. In the long-run, 
insider sales persistently generate positive abnormal profits, but insider purchases 
actually incur losses. Later in the paper, we will show, however, that some types of 
insider purchases are in fact highly profitable to the insiders. 
17 In this paper, the phrases "profits made" and "losses avoided" will have the same meaning. 
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In the following, the event-day average abnormal returns, and the post-
event day cumulative average abnormal returns associated with insider purchase 
and insider sale events are shown and analyzed according to groups by year of 
transaction, month of year of transaction, day of week of transaction, industry of 
the firm, firm size, book-to-market ratio of the firm, price-earnings ratio of the 
firm, relative trading volume in shares, and to groups by firm size and relative 
trading volume together. The insider trading sample is studied according to 
different by-groups to enable more detailed and precise analyses on the profitability 
of insider trading and the predictive ability of the insiders. 
5.1.2 By Year of Transaction 
Table 14 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns in the pre-event 
and post-event periods by year of transaction. For insider purchases in 1993, the 
only post-event significantly positive CAARs are the 20-day CAAR and the 180-
day CAAR. The values are 0.96% (t = 2.17) and 18.77% (t = 4.71). All other post-
event CAARs are not significant from zero. In the short run, stocks bought by 
insiders perform modestly, but perform rather well in the long-run by 180 days 
after the purchases. For insider sales, the post-event day CAARs are all 
significantly negative in the short-run and long-run. Since all the post-event 
CAARs are significantly negative, both the insiders and outsiders should be able to 
earn abnormal profits from their sales. 
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Insider purchases in 1994 generally occurred after a period of price drops; 
the pre-event CAAR is significantly negative at -1.36% {t = -3.61). The event day 
AAR is insignificantly positive, and so is the 5-day CAAR. The 20-day to the 180-
day post-event CAARs are all significantly negative. The 20-day and 180-day post-
event CAARs are -0.99% {t = -3.00) and -17.63% (t = -3.70) It seems that stocks 
bought by insiders did not perform well in that year. The CAARs for stocks sold by 
insiders show similar patterns to the ones of 1993，all short-run and long-run post-
event CAARs are significantly negative. Both insiders and outsiders are able to 
make abnormal profits in sale transactions. 
For the year 1995, the pre-event CAAR is significantly positive for insider 
purchases, and all the post-event CAARs are also significantly positive. Even 
though insiders do not seem to "buy low", stock prices do keep rising after insider 
purchases. It is possible that the outside investors are following the insiders, or the 
outsiders are just as enthusiastic as the insiders about the stocks. The 5-day, 20-day 
and 180-day post-event CAARs are at 0.89% (t = 4.44%), 3.06% (t = 6.88) and 
14.94% (t = 7.11). Insider sale transactions in the year 1995 show that insiders are 
able to “sell high". Before the event day, the CAAR is significantly positive at 
3.33% (t 二 3.81), but the post-event day CAARs are negative after insider sales. 
The 10-day, 90-day and 180-day are significantly negative at the 5-percent 
significance level. The 180-day CAAR is -9.74% (t = -2.24). Insiders are able to 
make significant abnormal profits from both purchase and sale transactions in the 
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long-run up to 180 days after the transaction day. Outsiders who mimic insiders to 
both buy or sell stocks of the firms are able to make abnormal profits. 
The post-event CAARs associated with insider purchases in 1996 are all 
significantly positive for the 5-day to 90-day periods after the transactions, except 
for the 30-day period which has an insignificantly positive CAAR. The 5-day 
CAAR is 0.73% (t = 3.71), and the 90-day CAAR is 4.10% (t = 3.41). The 180-day 
CAAR is insignificantly negative. The profits to insiders are significantly positive 
up to a period of 90-day after the transaction. Outsiders who mimic the trades of 
insiders are also likely able to make abnormal profits up to that period. The CAARs 
of insider sales show similar pattern as the ones for the year 1995. Insiders are able 
to "sell high", and the short-run and long-run post-event CAARs all significantly 
negative. The 20-day CAAR and the 180-day CAAR are at -2.29% (t = -4.22) and -
17.17% =-5.06). 
In 1997, purchases are made following a pre-event period of very 
significantly negative CAAR at -7.01% (t = -16.61). On the event day the AAR is 
at -0.36% (t = -3.48), but all the short-run and long-run post-event CAARs are still 
significantly negative. The 5-day, 20-day, 60-day and 180-day post-event CAARs 
are at-1.31% (t = -5.81), -5.48% (t = -11.33), -11.87% (t = -11.23) and -21.45% (t 
=-9.49) respectively. A quick response to this finding can be that since a stock 
crash occurred during the year, it is not surprising to see that even the stocks 
bought by insiders did not show good performance. This explanation is incorrect, 
however, since market-adjusted stock return is used in the study. Similar to the year 
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1996，insider sales occurred following a period of significantly positive CAAR. All 
the post-event period CAARs are significantly negative. The 5-day, 20-day, and 
60-day and the 180-day post-event CAARs are at -1.11% 0 = -2.97), -4.94% (t = -
5.80), -21.02% (t = -11.13) and -53.80% (t = -11.67). During this year, if outsiders 
follow insiders to sell, they might be able to avoid losses. 
In 1998，insider purchases are made following a pre-event period with 
significantly negative CAAR at -8.97% (t = -12.43). Insiders are able to "buy low" 
during the year. The post-event CAARs are all positive after the transaction day. 
The 5-day, and 60-day CAARs are 0.97% (t = 3.00) and 15.26% (t = 7.99). The 
90-day CAAR is less positive at 7.67% (t = 4.87), and the 180-day CAAR is 5.30% 
and is insignificantly positive. Insiders make profits from purchases in the medium-
run of up to a 90-day period after the transactions. Outsiders who buy stocks 
following insiders should be able to make abnormal profits up to that period. For 
insider sales, the post-event CAARs are all negative. The 5-day, 20-day, 60-day 
and 90-day CAARs are all significantly negative. The 90-day CAAR is -23.97% (t 
=-6.10). However the 180-day CAAR is insignificantly negative. Insiders make 
most profits from sales in the medium-run of up to 90-day period after the 
transaction. Outsiders should be able to earn abnormal profits by mimicking 
insiders to sell up to that period. 
In general, it is found that insiders are able to make abnormal profits in 
insider sales every year during the sample period. The cumulative average 
abnormal returns are found to exist for a prolonged period of up to 180-day after 
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the transaction. If outsiders follow insiders to sell stocks of a firm, it is very likely 
that the outsiders are also capable of making abnormal profits. For insider 
purchases, except for the year 1997 in which a market crash occurred, the very 
short-run 5-day CAAR is positive for every year, and the 20-day CAARs are also 
significantly positive for most years. However, the stocks bought by insiders 
perform well in some but not all years in the longer-run. If outside investors follow 
insiders to purchase without setting any criteria on which transactions to follow, the 
outsiders cannot always make abnormal profits, especially in the longer-run. 
5.1.3 By Calendar Month of Transaction 
The cumulative average abnormal returns around insider trading events by 
calendar month of the transaction day is presented in Table 15. In terms of the 
month in which insider trading occurs, the main focus is to see the performance of 
stocks bought by insiders in January. As suggested before, because of the January 
effect, buying is relatively more intensive in January. Compared to the post-event 
period CAARs of all other months of the year, we see that the post-event period 
CAARs associated with January purchases are the highest. The 10-day to 180-day 
post-event CAARs are all positive only for purchases occurred in January. Among 
these CAARs, the 10-day to 60-day CAARs are significantly positive. The 30-day 
CAAR is the highest at 6.18% {t = 8.35). As stated previously, some insiders might 
purchase stocks because of the January effect; however, here we see that the 
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longer-run cumulative abnormal returns of stocks bought by insiders in the month 
of January are indeed higher than those bought by insiders in other months of the 
year. Therefore, insiders buying stocks in January cannot be contributed by the 
January effect alone. 
Besides those of the month of January, significantly positive post-event day 
CAARs are found for purchases occurred in the months of February, April, July, 
August, and November. All the significantly positive post-event day CAARs are 
found within the short-runs of 20-days after the transaction day. In the longer-run 
after the event day, all the CAARs are either not significantly different from zero or 
significantly negative. For other months of the year, the post-event period CAARs 
are either not significantly different from zero or significantly negative. Overall 
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insiders are most likely to make abnormal profits from January purchases. In the 
short-run, purchases in February, April, July, August, and November might also 
bring abnormal profits to the insiders. In September, October, and December, 
insiders are even likely to lose in the short-runs when they purchase stocks of their 
own firms. In terms of the longer-run performances of stocks purchased by 
insiders, we see that the longer-run post-event CAARs are generally found to be 
negative or close to zero, except for the month of January. If outsiders wish to 
make abnormal profits by following insider purchases, the outsiders should follow 
purchases that occur in January. 
In terms of insider sales grouped by calendar month of occurrence, most of 
the medium to long-run post-event CAARs for are significantly negative. The 
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lowest 180-day CAAR is found in August at -50.13% {t = -5.91). Insiders are 
found to significantly "sell high" in the months of March, April, May, June, July, 
August, and September as the pre-event CAARs are significantly positive while the 
post-event periods CAARs are negative for these months. In all these months, 
insiders make significantly high abnormal profits through insider selling. In 
general, outsiders who mimic insider sales after receiving information about the 
transactions occurred in all calendar months of the year should also be able to make 
abnormal profits. 
The general conclusion from examining insider transactions in terms of 
calendar month of the year of occurrence is that insider purchases made on January, 
February, April, July, August, and November bring abnormal profits to the insiders 
themselves in the short-run, but insiders sales bring abnormal profits to the insiders 
in every month of the year. Outsiders are likely to earn abnormal profits following 
insider to sell regardless of the calendar month of the transaction, and they are most 
likely to earn abnormal profits only by following insider purchases in January. 
5.1.4 By Day of Week of the Transaction 
Next, we examine the cumulative average abnormal returns for insider 
trading by the day of the week on which the insider transaction occurs. The 
statistics are shown in table 16. For insider purchases, the CAARs of a period of up 
to 30 days after the transactions are not significant from zero in all days of the 
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week. The longer-runs 90-day and 180-day post-event CAARs are significantly 
negative for transactions that occur on Mondays and Wednesdays. For insider sales, 
all the pre-event CAARs are significantly positive while the post-event day CAARs 
are significantly negative. For insider sales, there is no particular day of the week 
on which insiders cannot make abnormal profits through the trading. If outsiders 
wish to make abnormal profits by following insiders to sell, they need not choose 
transactions that occurred on a particular day of the week to follow or to avoid. 
5.1.5 By Industry Classification of the Firm 
Table 17 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns for insider 
trading events according to industry classifications of the transaction firm. We see 
that only insiders belong to the finance industry are able to make significant 
abnormal profits through insider purchases. The insiders in the finance group are 
able to “buy low". The pre-event day CAAR is -6.32% {t = -7.25), and most of the 
short-run and longer-run post-event CAARs are significantly positive after insider 
purchases. The 5-day, 20-day and 180-day post-event CAARs are 1.06%, 2.45%, 
and 20.45%, and all significantly positive/For all other industries, most post-event 
CAARs for the short and medium-runs are not significantly different from zero. 
The 90-day post-event CAARs are significantly negative for the industry groups of 
consolidated enterprises, industrials, and hotels. The 180-day post-event CAARs 
are significantly negative for the above three industries as well as the properties 
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industry. On the whole, only the insiders of the finance industry are able to make 
abnormal returns from insider purchases. 
In terms of sale transactions, insiders of the industry groups of properties, 
consolidated enterprises, and industrials, sell stocks when prices are high. The pre-
event CAARs associated with sales for these three industry groups are significantly 
positive, and all the short-run and longer-run post-event CAARs are significantly 
negative. The post-event CAARs associated with insider sales are the most 
negative for the industrials group. The 5-day, 20-day, 60-day and 180-day post-
event CAARs are -1.42%, -5.49%, -21.89%, and -57.94%, and are all significantly 
negative. For the finance industry, the post-event CAAR is significantly negative 
for the period 1 to 90 days after the transaction day. For the utilities and the hotels 
industries, the pre-event and post-event CAARs around insider sales are all not 
significantly different from zero. In general, insiders of the properties, consolidated 
enterprises, industrials industries are most likely to be able to make profits from 
insider sales. 
As far as profit opportunity for outsiders is concerned, we see that they are 
most likely to make abnormal profits by following purchases of insiders who 
belong to the finance industry to buy, and by following insiders of the industry 
groups of the properties, consolidated enterprises, and industrials to sell. 
The abnormal price performance of insider transactions according to firm 
size, book-to-market ratio of the firm, and the price-earnings ratio of the firm will 
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be examined next. Table 18 to table 20 show the cumulative average abnormal 
returns for the insider purchases and sales according to these groups. 
5.1.6 By Size of the Firm 
Table 18 shows that cumulative average abnormal returns associated with 
insider trading grouped by the size of the firm involved in the trading. When insider 
transactions are grouped by the market value of the firm, we see that significantly 
positive post-event CAARs are found only for the small firms group. For this 
group, the 10-day, 20-day, 30-day to 60-day post-event CAARs are all significantly 
positive, and the 90-day and 180-day post-event CAARs are not significantly 
different from zero. The 20-day and 60-day post-event CAARs are 2.56% (/ = 
4.92) and 7.15% {t = 4.20). For the medium-size firms and large-size firms groups, 
the 5-day to 20-day post-event CAARs associated with insider purchases are not 
significantly different from zero, while the longer-run post-event CAARs up to a 
period of 180 days after the transaction day are even significantly negative. Insiders 
of medium-size firms and large-size firms are not able to make abnormal profits 
from purchasing stocks of their own firms. The findings here regarding the relation 
between firm size and insider purchases are consistent with the ones reported in 
Wong et. al (2000). They also find that insider purchases in small firms show the 
largest abnormal returns. 
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Relating firm size to insider sales, it can be seen that insiders of all firms, 
regardless of the size of the firm, are selling stocks at high prices. All the pre-event 
CAARs are positive before the transaction day, while all the post-event CAARs are 
negative. Comparing the three firm size groups, the post-event CAARs are lower 
for the small-size firms and medium-size firms groups. For the small-size firms 
group, the 5-day short-run and 180-day long-run post-event CAARs are -1.96% and 
-38.18%, while for the medium-sized firm group, the 5-day and 180-day CAARs 
are -1.43% and -36.63%. For the large-size firms group, the 5-day and 180-day 
CAARs are -0.25% and-11.13%. 
When transactions are grouped by firm size, the overall result shows that 
abnormal returns associated with both insider buying and selling activities are 
concentrated in small firms. Insiders in small firms are more likely to buy or sell 
stocks to make use of private information, and they do earn abnormal profits from 
trading even in the longer-run. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
information asymmetry is more severe among small firms. 
For outsiders, if they wish to make abnormal profits by following insiders to 
buy, the outsiders should only follow insiders in small firms. On the other hand, if 
outsiders wish to follow insiders to sell, the outsiders should choose to follow 
insiders in small firms first. However, following insiders in medium-size and large-
size firms to sell are also likely to bring abnormal profits to the outsiders. 
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5.1.7 By Book-to-Market Ratio of the Firm 
Stated previously, book-to-market (B/M) ratio is associated with the future 
prospect of the firm. Low book-to-market ratio predicts bad performance, while 
large book-to-market ratio predicts good performance. It is hypothesized that 
insiders tend to sell at periods of low B/M ratio and buy at high B/M periods. The 
frequencies of insider trading grouped by B/M was presented earlier in the paper. 
Now, we examine the relation between cumulative average abnormal returns 
associated with insider trading and B/M ratio. Table 19 shows the CAARs for 
insider trading events grouped by B/M ratio of the firm involved in the trading. In 
our sample, we also observe that the longer-run performance of stocks bought by 
insiders of large B/M ratio firms are significantly positive. The post-event CAARs 
are significantly positive in the periods of up to 90 days after the transaction day. 
The 180-day post-event CAAR is, however, significantly negative. Therefore, in 
the medium-run, insider purchases are profitable. For the medium B/M group, most 
of the post-event CAARs are not significantly different from zero, except for the 
60-day post-event CAAR which is -1.88% and is significantly negative. For the 
small B/M group, all the post-event CAARs are significantly negative. Therefore, 
we see that book-to-market ratio (large B/M ratio) and insider buying signal 
combined gives a more precise prediction of good stock performance up to a 90-
day period. 
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For stocks sold by insiders, the long-run CAARs are all significantly 
negative for the small and medium B/M groups up to a period of 180 days after the 
transaction day. The longer-run CAARs are also significantly negative up to a 
period of 90 days after transaction. The 180-day CAAR is significantly positive. 
The small B/M group shows the lowest longer-run CAARs. The 180-day CAAR 
for this group is as low as -43.66%. This is consistent with the hypothesis that small 
book-to-market ratio predicts bad future performance. The overall result suggests 
that insider trading signal combined with the book-to-market ratio of the firm 
involved in the insider trading gives a good prediction of the performance of the 
stock in the future than insider trading does alone. 
If outside investors wish to follow insiders in buying or selling stocks, they 
should buy large book-to-market ratio firms. Mimicking insider sales bring 
abnormal returns to outsiders regardless of book-to-market ratio of the firm; 
however, following insiders to sell small B/M firms is likely to produce the greatest 
amount of abnormal profits. 
5.1.8 By Price-Earnings Ratio of the Firm 
It is mentioned previously that low price-earnings (P/E) ratio is associated 
with high future stock return, while high P/E is associated with low future stock 
return. Therefore, it is likely that insiders buy when the P/E of the stock is low, and 
sell when the P/E is high. The frequencies of insider trading grouped by P/E has 
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been presented earlier in the paper. We now examine the relation between 
abnormal returns to insider trading and P/E ratio. Table 20 shows the CAARs for 
insider trading events grouped by P/E ratio of the firms involved in insider trading. 
Overall, we see that significantly positive post-event CAARs associated with 
insider purchases are found only in the small P/E group. The longer-run CAARs of 
stocks purchased by insiders grouped by P/E ratio show a pattern consistent with 
the hypothesis that future good stock performance is associated with low current 
P/E ratio. The post-event 30-day, 60-day and 90-day CAARs of the small P/E 
group are significantly positive. For the medium and large P/E group, the long-runs 
CAARs are all negative. 
For sale transactions, all short-run and long-run CAARs are significantly 
negative. The large P/E group has the most negative longer-run CAARs. The 180-
day post-event CAAR for the large P/E group is -36.47%, while the 180-day post-
event CAARs for the low and medium P/E groups are less than -20%. 
In general, we see that when the insider transactions are grouped by P/E 
ratios, they give a reasonably good prediction of stock performance in the future 
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than insider trading signal does alone. 
In terms of profit opportunities to outside investors, the outsiders are most 
likely to make abnormal profits by following insiders in small firms to buy and 
insiders in large firms to sell. 
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5.1.9 By Relative Trading Volume in Shares 
It is suggested by Karpoff (1987) that quality of information is positively 
related to trading volume. Now we examine the relation between relative trading 
volume and the abnormal price performance of the stock around insider 
transactions. Again, in the study, relative trading volume is the number of shares 
involved in the transaction relative to the number of share outstanding. Table 21 
shows the cumulative average abnormal returns for insider trading events grouped 
by relative trading volume of the transaction. For insider purchases, we see that 
significantly positive post-event CAARs are found for the small relative trading 
volume group only. The 10-day, 20-day, and 60-day post event CAARs are 
significantly positive for this group. For both the medium and large relative trading 
volume groups, the post-event CAARs are either not significantly different from 
zero or are significantly negative. Purchases in large trading volume do not predict 
good performance within a 180-day post-event period. We even see that longer-run 
CAARs for larger relative trading volume transactions are more negative. 
Therefore relative trading volume of insider purchases per se may contain little 
information. On the other hand for sale transactions, the post-event day CAARs are 
more negative for the large relative trading volume group. In the long-run of 180 
days after transaction, the 180-day CAAR for the small, medium, and large relative 
trading volume groups are -13.93%, -23.61%, and -54.50% respectively. All the 
CAARs are statistically significant. In general, the relative trading volume for sale 
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transaction seems to convey more information, and the worst future stock 
performances are followed by larger insider sales. Regardless of the relative trading 
volume of the transaction, insiders are all able to earn abnormal profits from selling 
the stocks of their firms. 
The best strategy for outsiders is to follow insiders who sell in high relative 
trading volume, although abnormal profits can be made by the outsiders when they 
follow insiders to sell regardless of relative trading volume of that transaction. On 
the other hand, outsiders who mimic insiders to buy by following large purchases 
by insiders are less likely to earn abnormal profits. However, this is against 
intuition. 
5.1.10 By Firm Size and Relative Trading Volume in Shares 
In their study of insider trading of Hong Kong around 1991 to 1993, Wong 
et. al (2000) find at abnormal profits are concentrated on purchase transactions 
involving small firms. Large relative trading volume transactions in small firms are 
found to have the highest abnormal returns in the 15-day period after transaction. 
The relation between size of the firm with insider trading and relative trading 
volume of the transaction relating to insider trading abnormal return will be 
examined below. 
Table 22 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns associated with 
insider trading events grouped by firm size and relative trading volume of the 
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transaction. In our sample, we find that purchases in the medium and high relative 
trading volume groups by insiders in small firms show significantly positive post-
event CAARs. The 10-day, 20-day and 30-day post-event CAARs are significantly 
positive. This is consistent with the findings in Wong et al. (2000). In general, we 
find that higher post-event CAARs associated with purchases in small firms 
regardless of the relative trading volume. The CAARs are the highest for the group 
of small firm size and medium relative trading volume. All the post-event CAARs 
for purchases are positive for this group, and the 10-day, 20-day, 30-day, 60-day ad 
180-day CAARs are significantly positive. The 180-day CAAR is 15.17% for this 
group. For the small firm size and large relative trading volume group, the 180-day 
CAAR is not significantly different from zero. In our sample, we also find 
significantly positive CAARs in the large firm size and small relative trading 
volume group. For this group, the 5-day, 10-day, and 90-day post-event CAARs are 
significantly positive, but the 180-day CAAR is significantly negative. For the 
medium-size firm groups, the shorter-run post-event CAARs are basically not 
statistically significant from zero, while most of the longer-runs post-event CAARs 
are significantly negative. 
For sale transactions, we find that the post-event day CAARs are more 
negative for large relative trading volume groups regardless of the size of the 
transaction firm. The long-runs post-event CAARs are more negative for large 
transactions for the small-size firm and medium-size firm groups. The 180-day 
post-event CAARs associated with large relative trading volume sales for the 
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small-size, medium-size and large-size firm groups are -62.09%, -63.84%, and -
43.67% respectively. 
Overall speaking, we find more significantly positive abnormal stock 
performances in medium and large purchases involving small firms, and more 
significantly negative abnormal stock performances in large purchases involving 
small and medium-sized firms. Wong et. al (2000) report that outsiders can earn 
abnormal profits by mimicking large purchases in small firms. By grouping insider 
purchases and sales by firm size and relative trading volume of the transactions, we 
find that for purchase transactions, small firm insiders making medium-sized 
purchases benefit the most. 
Our results show that the post-event CAARs for the group of small firm and 
medium-size purchases are the most positive, and they sustain for a longer post-
event period; therefore outsiders should be most likely make profits if they mimic 
medium-size insider purchases in small firms. If outsiders wish to follow insiders to 
sell stocks, the outsiders will find it most profitable to follow large sales involving 
small and medium-sized firms. 
We have considered the short-run and long-run abnormal price performance 
for insider purchases and sales in the aggregate, as well as by grouping transactions 
by year, month of the year, calendar day of the week, industry of the firm, firm 
size, book-to-market ratio of the firm, price-earning ratio of the firm, relative 
trading volume of the transaction, and by firm size and relative trading volume 
together. Overall speaking, we see that both purchases and sales are likely to bring 
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abnormal profits to the insiders within a period of 20 days after the transaction day. 
In the longer-run of up to 180 days after the transaction day, on average, insiders 
are more likely to make abnormal profits from selling stocks than buying stocks of 
their own companies. In the case of insider sales, the short-run and long-run post-
event cumulative average abnormal returns are likely to be significantly negative in 
the aggregate sample, as well as for by-groups that are formed according to 
different time, firm, and transaction specific characteristics. Besides profitability to 
insiders, this suggests that outsiders will also be able to make abnormal profits by 
mimicking insider sales. On the other hand, the short-run and long-run post-event 
CAARs associated with insider purchases are found to be significantly positive in 
some by-groups only, and we see that for other by-groups, the short-run and long-
run post-event CAARs associated with insider purchases are actually significantly 
negative. It seems that some insiders are not better informed than the others and 
those purchases are unlikely to be driven by private information. Nevertheless, we 
find significantly positive post-event CAARs after insider purchases in some by-
groups: 1) the transactions which occur in January, 2) the firm concerned is a 
finance company, 3) the firm is small in terms of market value, 4) the book-to-
market ratio of the firm is large, 5) the price-earning ratio of the firm is small, 6) 
the relative trading volume of the insider purchase is large, and 7) the firm is small 
and the insider purchase is high in relative trading volume. To maximize the chance 
of making abnormal profits and the magnitude of abnormal profits from following 
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insiders to buy, outsiders should follow insider buying activities with the above 
characteristics. 
Overall, most of stocks sold by insiders perform poorly, while the stocks 
bought by insiders continue to perform well in only some by-groups. It is found 
that the overall negative long run performance of stocks bought by insiders is 
caused mainly by overwhelmingly bad performance of stocks in certain years. 
Stocks that are bought by insiders did significantly well in some years. 
Furthermore, when transactions are grouped in firm-specific and transaction-
specific characteristics, we see that the abnormally good or bad performance of 
stocks after insider transactions in the longer-run are concentrated in certain groups. 
5.2 Aggregate Industry-wide Insider Trading Prior to Major Adjustments 
in the API Sectorial Index 
In this section, we will analyze whether aggregate industry-wide insider 
trading during periods prior to major industry-wide stock price movements are 
different from that during periods which are not followed by such major 
adjustments. 
Table 23 shows the months in which major industry-wide adjustments occur 
by the six industry classification groups. Table 24 to table 29 show for each of the 
industry group, the summary statistics for the aggregate relative trading volume of 
shares sold (ASHS), the aggregate relative trading volume of shares bought 
(ASHB), the "purchase transaction ratio" (FREQBS) and the "purchase share ratio" 
75 
(SHBS) for months which are followed by major adjustments in the AOI Sectorial 
Index and for months which are not followed by major Index adjustments, and the 
1 o 
r-statistics for comparing the four variables for different samples. 
For simplicity, a 10% or more increase in the individual AOI Sectorial 
Index will be described as a “major upward adjustment" in the Index, and a 10% or 
more decrease in individual AOI Sectorial Index will be described as a "major 
downward adjustment" in that Sectorial Index. 
18 It is worthwhile to note that in testing the differences between FREQBS, SHBS, ASHB, and 
ASHS for months which are followed by major adjustments in the AOI Sectorial Index and for 
months which are not followed by any major adjustments in the index, we face a problem of 
different sample sizes and possibly different variances of the 2 sample. It is very often that the 
sample size for months with major adjustment one month ahead is relatively small, while the sample 
size of months without any adjustments in the next month is larger. Variance tests sometimes do 
show that the two samples have different variances. Therefore, some of ？-statistics have to be 
interpreted with caution. 
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5.2.1 Finance Industry 
For the finance industry, both the average FREQBS and SHBS are higher 
for the calendar months which are followed by major upward adjustment in AOI 
Finance Index than for months which are not followed by any major adjustment in 
the Index in the next month. Both the average ASHB and ASHS are smaller for the 
calendar months followed by major upward adjustments. The values show that 
only the average FREQBS and SHBS are significantly different for the two 
samples. This means that for the finance industry as a whole, there are more insider 
purchase and/or less insider sale transactions in calendar months before major 
upward adjustments in the Index. The number of shares bought by insiders of the 
finance industry is larger and/or the number of shares sold by the insiders is 
smaller. Comparing for the calendar months followed by major downward 
adjustments in Finance Index and for the months which are not followed by any 
major adjustments in the Index, the average FREQBS, SHBS, and ASHB are 
smaller for the months followed by major downward adjustment in the Index. 
However the r-values show that all the variables are not significantly different for 
the two samples. Detailed statistics are shown in table 24. Overall speaking, we see 
that for the finance industry, insiders are more active in buying stocks and less 
active in selling stocks of their firms in the calendar months prior to major 
increases in the stock prices across the finance industry. Insider buying and selling 
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activities for the finance industry are not significantly different for the calendar 
months ahead of major downward adjustments to the stock prices industry-wide. 
5.2.2 Utilities Industry 
Next, we consider the aggregate insider buying and selling activity for the 
utilities industry. Table 25 shows the summary statistics of FREQBS, SHBS, 
ASHB, and ASHS, and the ^-statistics for comparing these variables for different 
samples. The average FREQBS and SHBS are larger for the calendar months 
before major upward adjustments in AOI Utilities Index, while the average ASHB 
and ASHS are smaller for the months prior to major upward adjustments in the 
Index, r-test results show that, however, for the two samples, the average 
FREQBS, SHBS, AHSB and ASHS are not significantly different. Comparing for 
the months with major downward adjustments and without any major adjustments 
in the AOI Utilities Index in the next calendar month, we see that the average 
FREQBS is smaller while the average SHBS is larger for calendar months ahead of 
major downward adjustments; but for these two variables, the differences are not 
statistically significant. In terms of aggregate relative trading volume, both ASHB 
and ASHS are larger for months followed by major downward adjustments in the 
Index than for months not followed by any kind of major adjustments. Only ASHB 
is significantly different for the samples. This means that insiders of the utilities 
industry actually bought more stocks during the months before large stock prices 
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decrease industry-wide. Table 23 shows that in some calendar months, both major 
upward and downward adjustments to the AOI Utilities Index occurred. We also 
compare the average FREQBS, SHBS, ASHB, and ASHS for these months with 
those averages for months which are not followed by any kind of major 
adjustments in the Index. For the utilities industry, we see that the averages are not 
significantly different for the two samples. In general, insiders of the utilities 
industry are not more active in buying or selling stocks of their firms before major 
fluctuations in stock prices for the whole industry. This may imply that utilities 
industry insiders do not have earlier access to superior information about the 
industry than do the outsiders. 
5.2.3 Properties Industry 
Table 26 shows the summary statistics for FREQBS, SHBS, ASHB, and 
ASHS, and the ^-statistics for comparing these variables for different samples for 
the properties industry. The average FREQBS and SHBS are found to be larger for 
the calendar months followed by major upward adjustments to the AOI Properties 
Index than for the months which are not followed by any kind of major adjustments 
in the Index. The differences in SHBS between the two samples are statistically 
significant. Average ASHB is smaller for months followed by major downward 
adjustment to the AOI Industry Index, while average ASHSs are roughly the same 
for the two samples. The ？-values for comparing the two variables for the two 
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samples show that their differences are insignificant. Now, we compare average 
FREQBS, SHBS, ASHB and ASHS for months before major downward 
adjustments in the AOI Properties Index to those averages for months not followed 
by any major adjustments in the Index, we see that all the values for the variables 
are insignificantly different between the two samples. Finally, we examine average 
FREQBS, SHBS, ASHB and ASHS for months which are followed by both major 
upward and downward adjustments in the Index in the next month to those 
averages for months not followed any kind of major adjustments to the Index. We 
see that both the average FREQBS and ASHB are significantly larger for the 
months before major upward and downward adjustments in the Index. In summary, 
during the calendar months before major upward adjustment to the AOI Properties 
Index, insiders tend to buy more stocks and/or sell less stocks of their firms. 
Therefore it is possible that insiders of the properties industry do have superior 
information about the industry and are capable of predicting occurrences of major 
upward adjustment to the stock prices across the industry during one calendar 
month ahead of time, and insiders formulate their insider trading strategy 
accordingly. In addition, we see that there are more insider purchase transactions 
and less insider sale transactions before the calendar months which are followed by 
both large increases and decreases in the stock prices across the industry, and 
insiders tend to buy more stocks of their firms during these periods. It is uncertain 
whether insiders are able to predict such fluctuations in the stock prices, and are 
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capable of making profits from the transactions, but we see that insiders are just 
more active in buying stocks during those periods. 
5.2.4 Consolidated Enterprises Industry 
The aggregate insider buying and selling activities for the consolidated 
enterprises industry are considered next. Table 27 shows the summary statistics for 
FREQBS, SHBS, ASHB, and ASHS, and the 厂statistics for comparing these 
variables for different samples for the industry. Comparing average FREQBS, 
SHBS, ASHB, and ASHS for months for months which are followed by major 
upward adjustment in the AOI Consolidated Enterprises Index to those averages for 
months which are not followed by any major adjustments to the Index, only 
FREQBS is significantly larger for months ahead of major upward adjustments. 
SHBS is larger for months prior to major upward adjustment to the Index, but t-test 
shows that the difference is not significant. Next, we compare average FREQBS, 
SHBS, ASHB, and ASHS for months which are followed by major downward 
adjustments in the index to those averages which are not followed by any major 
adjustments in the Index. We find that all the FREQBS, SHBS, ASHB, and ASHS 
are not significantly different for the two samples. Finally, we examine the average 
FREQBS, SHBS, ASHB and ASHS for months which are followed by both major 
upward and downward adjustments in the Index in the coming month and those for 
months which are not followed by any kind of major adjustments to the Index. 
81 
FREQBS is significantly larger for months which are followed by both major 
upward and downward adjustments in the Index. For the consolidated enterprises 
industry as a whole, the number of buying transactions is larger and/or the number 
of selling transactions is smaller for the months ahead of major upward adjustments 
in the Index, and for the months ahead of both upward and downward adjustments 
in the Index in the coming month. Insiders of consolidated enterprises may be 
better informed about the situation of the whole industry and are capable of 
predicting large increases in the stock prices across the industry one calendar month 
in advance. 
5.2.5 Industrials Industry 
Table 28 shows the summary statistics for FREQBS, SHBS, ASHB, and 
ASHS, and the ^-statistics for comparing these variables for different samples for 
the industrials industry. We see that the average FREQBS is significantly larger for 
months which are followed by major upward adjustment in the AOI Industrials 
Index than for months which are not followed by any kind of major adjustments in 
the Index. Next, it can be seen that the average SHBS is significantly smaller for 
the months which are followed by major downward adjustments in the Index than 
for the months. Comparing the average FREQBS, SHBS, ASHB, and ASHS for 
months which are followed by both major upward and downward adjustments in 
the Index to these averages for months which are not followed by any kind of major 
adjustments in the Index, r-test results show that all the differences in the values of 
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these variables for the two samples are not significant. For the industrials industry 
as a whole, the number of insider purchases is larger and/or the number of insider 
sales is smaller before major increases in the stock prices across the sector. Also, 
insiders tend to sell more stocks before major decreases in the stock prices across 
the industry. The aggregate insider trading activity of the industrials industry shows 
that insiders of the industry may have superior industry-wide information than 
outsiders and are able to foresee both major upward and downward adjustments in 
the AOI Industrial Index in one calendar ahead of time. It is possible that these 
insiders plan their insider trading activities according to their superior information 
and prediction. 
5.2.6 Hotels Industry 
Lastly, the aggregate insider buying and selling activity for the hotels 
industry are considered. Table 29 shows the summary statistics for FREQBS, 
SHBS, ASHB, and ASHS, as well as the 广statistics for comparing these variables 
for different samples for the hotels industry. The t-test results show that the average 
FREQBS, SHBS, ASHB, and ASHS are not significantly different either for 
months before major upward adjustments or for months before major downward 
adjustments to the AOI Hotels Index, from the averages for months not followed by 
any kinds of adjustments in the Index. For months followed by both major upward 
and downward adjustments to the Index, only SHBS is significantly larger. Overall 
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speaking, we see that insiders are buy more and/or sell less in terms of number of 
shares during the calendar months which are followed by both large increases and 
decreases in the stock prices across the industry. It is uncertain whether insiders are 
able to predict such relatively large fluctuations in the stock prices, and are capable 
of making profits from the transactions, but insiders are just purchasing more 
stocks during those periods. There are several interpretations to the observations 
regarding the insider activity of the hotels industry. It is possible that in the 
aggregate, insiders of the hotels industry do not have better information than the 
outsiders, and they are not able to predict major upward and downward fluctuations 
in the stock prices of the firms. If this is not the case, another possibility is that 
hotels industry insiders do not plan in particular their insider buying and selling 
activities according to their predictions of possible major movements in the stock 
prices. 
In summary, we find that 1) insiders of the industrials industry show a 
different pattern of insider buying and selling activities during one calendar month 
prior to either major industry-wide upward or downward adjustments in the stock 
prices from that during months which are not followed by any major industry-wide 
stock price adjustments, 2) insiders of the finance industry, the properties industry, 
and the consolidated enterprises industry show different patterns of insider buying 
and selling activities only during the calendar month prior to major industry-wide 
upward adjustments in the stock prices. 3) insiders of the industrials, finance, 
properties, and consolidated enterprises industries are more likely to be able to 
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predict major industry-wide stock price movements in one calendar month ahead of 
time and plan their insider trading activities accordingly, and 4) insiders of the 
utilities and the hotels industries may not be good at predicting major industry-wide 
stock price movements, or that they do not plan especially according to their 




Reported insider trading of the Hong Kong stock market between the period 
of 1993 and 1998 is examined in the study. The overall result shows that, even 
though there exist legislation to regulate transactions by corporate insiders, the 
directors and chief executives, these individuals are still able to make abnormal 
profits from insider trading activities. In the aggregate, we find that insiders are 
able to earn abnormal profits from both insider buying and selling activities in the 
short-run of up to 20 days after the transaction day. In the long-run up to 180 days 
after the transaction day, we find significantly negative abnormal returns for both 
insider sales and insider purchases. The result may seem odd since it is contrary to 
the widespread belief that Hong Kong corporate insiders are making huge profits 
from their insider purchase transactions. By examining abnormal performance of 
stocks traded by insiders according to different calendar year, month of the year, 
day of the week, industry groups, firm size, book-to-market ratio of the firm, price-
eamings ratio of the firm, and relative trading volume of the insider transaction, we 
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see that some insider purchases in fact produce large and persistent abnormal 
profits; the characteristics of these purchases are that they occur in January, the 
firm concerned is a finance company, the firm is small in terms of market value, the 
book-to-market ratio of the firm is large, the price-earning ratio of the firm is small, 
and the relative trading volume of the insider purchase is large. In terms of profit 
opportunities to outsiders, they should be able to make abnormal profits by 
following most of the insider sale transactions to sell, but only selected insider 
purchase transactions to buy. In this paper, we also examine whether aggregate 
industry-wide insider trading activity prior to major industry-wide stock price 
movements are different from that of periods which are not followed by such major 
adjustments. We find that insiders of the industrials, finance, properties, and 
consolidated enterprises industries are more likely able to predict major industry-
wide stock price movements in one calendar month ahead of time and arrange their 
trades accordingly. The results imply that tougher regulation on insider trading may 
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T A B L E 10 
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON INSIDER TRADING DATA 
FROM JANUARY 1993 TO DECEMBER 1998 
Purchases Sales All 
Transactions 
Number of Transactions 16221 23675 
Number of Firms with Insider Trading 507 458 541 
Average Number of Shares Traded per 4427747 5589757 5136724 
Transaction 
Average Value of Shares Traded per $9,225,137 $17,124,634 $11,487,213 
Transaction  
Note: Purchases and Sales refer to open market purchases and open market sales 
by company directors and chief executives. 
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T A B L E 10 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INSIDER TRADING EVENTS BY YEAR 
i m I W A L L 
YEARS 
Number of Insider 
Transactions 
Purchases 1 5 0 8 2 ^ 4 1 6 2 2 1 
Sales 2151 1111 758 981 1599 854 7574 
All transactions 4572 5359 2266 2614 4523 4341 23675 
Ratio of purchases to 1.126 3.824 1.989 1.665 1.829 4.083 2.142 
sales 
Number of Firms with 
Insider Trading 
Purchases ^ ^ " 2 2 9 ^ ^ ^ 50?" 
Sales 218 192 177 232 253 153 458 
All transactions 280 327 290 299 395 309 541 
97 
T A B L E 10 
VALUE OF SHARES TRADED BY YEAR (IN HK$ MILLION) 
YEAR ITO 1996 1998 
Purchases 13,240.869 10,178.2686,388.852 10,297.490 16,105.000 3,848.848 
Sales 9,026.458 4,887.220 6,901.451 7,870.484 7,715.961 4,098.408 
All 22,267.327 15,065.488 13,290.303 18,167.974 23,820.961 7,947.256 
transactions 
Source: Data extracted from Yearly Statistics: (Directors Dealings) by ITA-
Disclosure Inc. Value of shares traded include open market purchases and 
open market sales by corporate directors only. 
According to Robert Halili of the ITA-Disclosure, the statistics in this 
table excludes all double trades (i.e., the same trades under different 
directors which represent the same holdings). 
98 
T A B L E 10 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INSIDER TRADING EVENTS 
BY CALENDAR MONTH OF THE YEAR 
Month January February March April May June 
Purchases ^ ^ i m 1358 
Sales 685 609 392 466 536 579 
All 2634 1907 1078 1429 1742 1937 
transactions 
Ratio of 2.845 2.131 1.750 2.067 2.250 2.345 
purchases to 
sales 
Month July August September October November December 
Purchases 15^ f m 14^ 2 m 15^ 
Sales 531 815 722 946 803 370 
All 2056 1987 2204 3079 2371 1251 
transactions 




T A B L E 10 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INSIDER TRADING EVENTS IN 
JANUARY BY FIRM SIZE AND TYPE OF TRANSACTION 
Group Small Firm Size Medium Firm Size Large Firm Size 
Purchases in 844 ^ ^ 
January 
Sales in January 175 223 287 
Ratio of purchases 4.823 2.682 1.763 
to sales 
Note: Firm size is measured by market capitalization (i.e., market price of the 
stock multiplied by the total number of share outstanding). Since the sample 
period of the study runs from 1993 to 1998, firm size of the insider trading 
firm is calculated for every transaction based on the month-end figures of 
the month prior to the insider trading occurred. 
Data were obtained from the PACAP database. 
The number of purchases and sales do not sum to the figures shown in 
Table 2 due to missing data in PACAP. 
Small Firm Size: Market capitalization is less than or equal to HK$618 
million. 
Medium Firm Size: Market capitalization is between HK$618 and 
HK$1991 million. 
Large Firm Size: Market capitalization is larger than HK$1991 million. 
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T A B L E 10 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INSIDER TRADING EVENTS 
BY DAY OF THE WEEK 
Day Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Purchases 35^ ^ sTlQ 3331 
Sales 1614 1544 1425 1406 1465 
All transactions 5119 4789 4446 4525 4796 




T A B L E 10 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INSIDER TRADING EVENTS 
BY INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION 
Industry group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Purchases Wl 123 4 2 ^ ^ ^ 
Sales 433 87 1666 2772 2196 158 132 
All transactions 1134 210 6942 7071 7034 1079 195 
Ratio of 1.619 1.414 3.167 1.551 2.203 5.829 0.477 
purchases to sales 
Number of ^ 15 Wl ^ 15 
companies* 
Industry classification: 1 = Finance 2 = Utilities 3 = Properties 
4 = Consolidated Enterprises 
5 = Industrials 6 = Hotels 7 二 Miscellaneous 
Note: * The figures in the row refer to the number of companies 
in that industry classification as in end of January 1998. 
Industry classification is assigned by the Stock Exchange 
according to the nature of the business of the company. 
Source: Various issues of SEHK Monthly Bulletin published by The 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. 
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T A B L E 10 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INSIDER TRADING EVENTS 
BY SIZE OF THE FIRM 
Group Small Firm Size Medium Firm Large Firm Size 
Group Size Group Group 
Purchases 6141 52^ 4784 
Sales 1900 2571 2981 
All transactions 8041 7862 7765 
Ratio of purchases to sales 3.232 2.058 1.605 
Note: Firm size is measured by market capitalization (i.e., market price of the 
stock multiplied by the total number of share outstanding). Since the sample 
period of the study runs from 1993 to 1998, firm size of the insider trading 
firm is calculated for every transaction based on the month-end figures of 
the month prior to the insider trading occurred. 
Data were obtained from the PACAP database. 
The number of purchases and sales do not sum to the figures shown in 
Table 2 due to missing data in PACAP. 
Small Firm Size: Market capitalization is less than or equal to HK$618 
million. 
Medium Firm Size: Market capitalization is between HK$618 and 
HK$1991 million. 
Large Firm Size: Market capitalization is larger than HK$1991 million. 
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T A B L E 10 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INSIDER TRADING EVENTS 
BY BOOK-TO-MARKET (B/M) RATIO OF THE FIRM 
Group Low B/M Ratio Medium B/M High B/M Ratio 
Group Ratio Group Group 
Purchases ^ 4 4 ^ 5203 
Sales 3191 2030 1284 
All transactions 6578 6455 6487 
Ratio of purchases to sales 1.061 2.180 4.052 
Note: Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value (i.e., total stockholders' 
equity) to market value. Book value of the insider trading firm for every 
transaction is based on the fiscal year-end figures of the year prior to that 
year when insider trading occurred. 
Data were obtained from the PACAP database. 
The number of purchases and sales do not sum to the figures shown in 
Table 2 due to missing data in PACAP. 
Low Book-to-Market Ratio: Book-to-Market Ratio is less than or equal to 
0.580. 
Medium Book-to-Market Ratio: Book-to-Market Ratio is between 0.580 
and 1.282. 
Large Book-to-Market Ratio: Book-to-Market Ratio is larger than 1.282. 
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T A B L E 10 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INSIDER TRADING EVENTS BY 
PRICE-EARNINGS (P/E) RATIOS OF THE FIRM 
Group Low P/E Ratio Medium P/E High P/E Ratio 
Group Ratio Group Group 
Purchases 4712 4 m 3691 
Sales 1836 1842 2825 
All transactions 6548 6449 6516 
Ratio of purchases to sales 2.566 2.501 1.307 
Note: Price-earnings ratio is the ratio of current share price to earnings per share 
over the past year. Earnings-per-share of the insider trading firm for every 
transaction is based on the fiscal year-end figure of the year prior to that 
year when insider trading occurred. 
Data were obtained from the PACAP database. 
The number of purchases and sales do not sum to the figures shown in 
Table 2 due to missing data in PACAP. 
Low Price-Earnings Ratio: Price-Earnings Ratio is less than or equal to 
7.88. 
Medium Price-Earnings Ratio: Price-Earnings Ratio is between 7.88 and 
15.11. 
Large Price-Earnings Ratio: Price-Earnings Ratio is larger than 15.11. 
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T A B L E 10 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INSIDER TRADING EVENTS 
BY RELATIVE TRADING VOLUME IN SHARES 
Group Small relative Medium relative Large relative 
trading volume trading volume trading volume 
group group group 
Purchases ^ 5103 
Sales 2345 2318 2791 
All transactions 7872 7904 7894 
Ratio of purchases to sales 2.357 2.410 1.828 
Note: Relative trading volume in share is defined as the number of shares traded 
in the insider trading transaction divided by the total share outstanding. 
Total share outstanding is based on the month-end figure of the month prior 
to that month when insider trading occurred, and is obtained from PACAP. 
The number of purchases and sales do not sum to the figures shown in 
Table 2 due to missing data in PACAP. 
Small Relative Trading Volume: Relative Trading Volume is less than or 
equal to 0.0000181%. 
Medium Relative Trading Volume: Relative Trading Volume is between 
0.000181% and 0.0000898%. 
Large Relative Trading Volume: Relative Trading Volume is larger than 
0.0000898%. 
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T A B L E 10 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INSIDER TRADING EVENTS 
BY FIRM SIZE AND RELATIVE TRADING VOLUME 
Group Small relative Medium Large relative 
trading relative trading 
volume group trading volume group 
volume group 
Small Firm Size Purchases 15^ 22^ 2288 
Sales 228 530 1142 
All transactions 1795 2811 3430 
Ratio of 6.873 4.304 2.004 
purchases to sales 
Medium Firm SizePurchases r m 1170 
Sales 621 912 1038 
All transactions 2363 2691 2208 
Ratio of 2.805 1.951 1.127 
purchases to sales 
Large Firm Size Purchases 22l8 1040 
Sales 1496 876 609 
All transactions 3714 2402 1649 
Ratio of 1.483 1.742 1.708 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































OCCURRENCE OF MAJOR ADJUSTMENT IN AOI SECTORIAL INDICES 
Year and month of occurrence Major Adjustment Year and month of occurrence Major Adjustment 
Industry = Finance Industry = Properties  
199403 Down 199303 Down 
199707 Up 199311 Up 
199709 Down 199312 Up 
199710 Down 199401 Up and Down 
199711 Up 199403 Down 
199801 Down 199404 Down 
199802 Up 199405 Up 
199810 Up 199407 Up 
199411 Down 
Industry = Utilities 199501 D � w n 
199502 Up 
199310 Up 199505 Up 
1 9 9 3 1 1 Up 199603 Down 
199401 Down 199706 Down 
199403 Down 199709 Down 
199709 Up and Down 199710 Down 
199710 Down 199711 Up and Down 
1 9 9 7 1 1 Up 199712 Down 
199801 Up and Down 199801 Up and Down 
199802 Up 199802 Up 
199806 Down 199805 Down 
199808 Up and Down 199806 Up and Down 
199809 Up and Down 199808 Up and Down 




TABLE 14 (CONTINUED) 
Year and month of occurrence Major Adjustment Year and month of occurrence Major Adjustment 
Industry = Consolidated Enterprises Industry = Hotels  
199303 Down 199303 Down 
199401 Up and Down 199401 Up and Down 
199403 Down 199501 Down 
199411 Down 199710 Down 
199502 Up 199711 Up 
199505 Up 199801 Up and Down 
199603 Down 199802 Up 
199709 Up and Down 199806 Down 
199710 Down 199808 Up and Down 
1 9 9 7 1 1 Up and Down 199809 Up and Down 
199712 Down 199810 Up 
199801 Up and Down 199811 Up 
199802 Up 199812 Down 
199806 Up and Down 199901 Up 
199808 Up 




Industry = Industrials 
199709 Up and Down 
199710 Down 




199806 Up and Down 
199809 Up and Down 
199901 Down 
Note: Major adjustment in an AOI Sectorial Index is defined as a 10% or more increase or decrease in the 5-day 
cumulative return on the Index. 
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TABLE 24 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE AGGREGATE INSIDER TRADING INDICATORS FOR 
MONTHS WITH AND WITHOUT MAJOR ADJUSTMENT TO THE AOI SECTORIAL INDEX 
AND THE T-STATISTICS FOR COMPARING THE INDICATORS 
FOR THE DIFFERENT PERIODS 
INDUSTRY GROUP OF FINANCE 
Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of Average Standard Deviation 
Index in the next calendar Months 
month  
FREQBS < |10%| 53 2.4193 4.5282 
FREQBS > o r = 1 0 % 4 9.4542 11.057 
SHBS <|10%| 53 13.536 37.156 
SHBS > o r = 1 0 % 4 54.118 64.903 
ASHB <|10%| 64 0.00003570 0.0001 
ASHB > o r = 1 0 % 4 0.00001640 0.0000131 
ASHS <|10%| 64 0.00001690 0.0001 
ASHS > o r = 1 0 % 4 0.QQQQQ633 Q.QQQQ1Q9  
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF r-values Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal 55 -2.66 0.0103 
FREQBS Unequal 3.08 -1.26 0.2934 
SHBS Equal 55 -2 0.0507 
SHBS Unequal 3.15 -1.24 0.3008 
ASHB Equal 66 0.37 0.7117 
ASHB Unequal 41.4 1.33 0.1899 
ASHS Equal 66 0.31 0.7544 
ASHS Unequal 26.8 0.2981 
Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of Average Standard Deviation 
Index in the next calendar Months 
month  
FREQBS <or = -10% 3 1.3777 1.303 
FREQBS <|10%| 53 2.4193 4.5282 
SHBS <or = -10% 3 9.4712 15.892 
SHBS <|10%| 53 13.536 37.156 
ASHB <or = -10% 4 0.00003100 0.00003630 
ASHB <|10%| 64 0.00003570 0.0001 
ASHS <or = -10% 4 0.00001890 0.00002930 
ASHS <|1Q%| 64 0.00001690 0.0001 
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TABLE 24 (CONTINUED) 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF r-values Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal 54 -0.39 0.6949 
FREQBS Unequal 5.57 -1.07 0.33 
SHBS Equal 54 -0.19 0.8522 
SHBS Unequal 3.42 -0.39 0.7215 
ASHB Equal 66 -0.09 0.9286 
ASHB Unequal 6.67 -0.21 0.8401 
ASHS Equal 66 0.06 0.9535 
ASHS Unequal 5.24 0.12 0.9109 
Note: The aggregate insider trading indicators are: FREQBS, the total number of insider 
purchase transactions divided by the total number of insider sale transactions (i.e., the 
"purchase transaction ratio")； SHBS, the total number of shares bought by insiders 
divided by the total number of shares sold by insiders (i.e., the "purchase share ratio")； 
ASHS, the aggregation of relative trading volume of shares sold; and ASHB, the 
aggregation of relative trading volume of shares bought. 
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TABLE 24 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE AGGREGATE INSIDER TRADING INDICATORS FOR 
MONTHS WITH AND WITHOUT MAJOR ADJUSTMENT TO THE AOI SECTORIAL INDEX 
AND THE T-STATISTICS FOR COMPARING THE INDICATORS 
FOR THE DIFFERENT PERIODS 
INDUSTRY GROUP OF UTILITIES 
Summary Statistics  
Variable Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of Average Standard Deviation 
Index in the next calendar Months 
month  
FREQBS < |10%| 23 1.1905 2.4957 
FREQBS > o r = 1 0 % 2 4.0833 4.1248 
SHBS <|10%| 23 6.5067 21.316 
SHBS > or = 10% 2 37.65 52.114 
ASHB < |10%| 32 0.000004480 0.000014000 
ASHB > o r = 1 0 % 5 0.000000603 0.000000789 
ASHS <|10%| 32 0.000004130 0.000010200 
ASHS > or = 10% 5 Q.QQ00QQ044 0.0QQ0QQQ88 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF "values Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal Equal 23 -1.52 
FREQBS Unequal Unequal 1.06 -0.98 
SHBS Equal Equal 23 -1.8 
SHBS Unequal Unequal 1.03 -0.84 
ASHB Equal Equal 35 0.61 
ASHB Unequal Unequal 32.2 1.55 
ASHS Equal Equal 35 0.89 
ASHS Unequal Unequal 31 ^  
Summary Statistics  
Variable Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of Average Standard Deviation 
Index in the next calendar Months 
month  
FREQBS c o r = -10% 1 1 . 
FREQBS <|10%| 23 1.1905 2.4957 
SHBS c o r = -10% 1 10.337 . 
SHBS <|10%| 23 6.5067 21.316 
ASHB <or = -10% 4 0.0001 0.0002 
ASHB <|10%| 32 0.000004480 0.00001400 
ASHS <or = -10% 4 0.000009500 0.00001900 
ASHS <|10%| 32 0.000004130 0.00001020 
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TABLE 24 (CONTINUED) 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF f-values Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal 22 -0.07 0.9411 
FREQBS Unequal 0 . . 
SHBS Equal 22 0.18 0.862 
SHBS Unequal 0 . . 
ASHB Equal 34 2.97 0.0054 
ASHB Unequal 3 0.96 0.4077 
ASHS Equal 34 0.9 0.3735 
ASHS Unequal 3.22 0.6147 
Summary Statistics  
Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of 
Variable Index in the next calendar Months Average Standard Deviation 
month ； 
FREQBS <|10%| 23 1.1905 2.4957 
FREQBS < or = -10% and > or = 10% 0 . . 
SHBS <|10%| 23 6.5067 21.316 
SHBS < or = -10% and > or = 10% 0 . . 
ASHB <|10%| 32 0.000004480 0.000014000 
ASHB < or = -10% a n d �o r = 10% 4 0.000000573 0.000001150 
ASHS <|10%| 32 0.000004130 0.000010200 
ASHS < or = -10% and > or = 10% 4 Q.QQOOQQOQQ Q.OQOOQOOOO 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF r-values Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal 0 
FREQBS Unequal 0 . • 
SHBS Equal 0 . • 
SHBS Unequal 0 . . 
ASHB Equal 34 0.55 0.5848 
ASHB Unequal 33.4 1.54 0.133 
ASHS Equal 34 0.8 0.4288 
ASHS Unequal 31 ^ 0.0287 
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TABLE 26 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE AGGREGATE INSIDER TRADING INDICATORS FOR 
MONTHS WITH AND WITHOUT MAJOR ADJUSTMENT TO THE AOI SECTORIAL INDEX 
AND THE T-STATISTICS FOR COMPARING THE INDICATORS 
FOR THE DIFFERENT PERIODS 
INDUSTRY GROUP OF PROPERTIES 
Summary Statistics  
Variable Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of Average Standard Deviation 
Index in the next calendar Months 
month  
FREQBS <|10%| 46 3.95 3.6442 
FREQBS > o r = 1 0 % 8 4.7746 2.7493 
SHBS <|10%| 46 5.7642 15.334 
SHBS > o r = 1 0 % 8 23.749 38.428 
ASHB <|10%| 46 0.0077 0.0275 
ASHB > o r = 1 0 % 8 0.0005 0.0005 
ASHS <|10%| 46 0.0002 0.0004 
ASHS > o r = 1 0 % 8 0-0002 (10003 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF Lvalues ProbTjT  
FREQBS Equal 52 -0.61 0.5454 
FREQBS Unequal 11.8 -0.74 0.4724 
SHBS Equal 52 -2.34 0.0331 
SHBS Unequal 7.39 -1.31 0.2308 
ASHB Equal 52 0.73 0.4681 
ASHB Unequal 45.2 1.77 0.0843 
ASHS Equal 52 0.27 0.7868 
ASHS Unequal 12 0.34 0.7427 
Summary Statistics  
Variable Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of Average Standard Deviation 
Index in the next calendar Months 
month  
FREQBS <or = -10% 12 6.9147 10.494 
FREQBS <]10%| 46 3.95 3.6442 
SHBS <or = -10% 12 3.7986 6.6057 
SHBS <|10%| 46 5.7642 15.334 
ASHB c o r = -10% 12 0.0131 0.0277 
ASHB <|10%| 46 0.0077 0.0275 
ASHS <or = -10% 12 0.0002 0.0003 
ASHS < |1Q%| ^ 0.0002 0.0004 
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TABLE 24 (CONTINUED) 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF �l u e s Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal 56 1.61 0.1132 
FREQBS Unequal 11.7 0.96 0.3547 
SHBS Equal 56 -0.43 0.6678 
SHBS Unequal 42.9 -0.66 0.5099 
ASHB Equal 56 0.61 0.5432 
ASHB Unequal 17.1 0.61 0.5502 
ASHS Equal 56 -0.03 0.9799 
ASHS Unequal 21.2 0.9771 
Summary Statistics - _ 
Variable Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of Average Standard Deviation 
Index in the next calendar Months 
month  
FREQBS <|10%| 46 3.95 3.6442 
FREQBS < or = -10% and > or = 10% 6 9.0271 5.9555 
SHBS <|10%| 46 5.7642 15.334 
SHBS < or = -10% a n d � o r =10% 6 22.971 49.228 
ASHB <|10%| 46 0.0077 0.0275 
ASHB < or = -10% a n d �o r = 10% 6 0.0676 0.1654 
ASHS < |10%| 46 0.0002 0.0004 
ASHS < or =-10% and > or =10% 6 Q.Q0Q039QQ Q.Q00Q3790 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF lvalues Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal 50 -2.97 0.0046 
FREQBS Unequal 5.5 -2.04 0.0919 
SHBS Equal 50 -1.86 0.0687 
SHBS Unequal 5.13 -0.85 0.4328 
ASHB Equal 50 -2.36 0.0222 
ASHB Unequal 5.04 -0.89 0.4163 
ASHS Equal 50 1.22 0.2282 
ASHS Unequal 49.6 ^ 0.0019 
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TABLE 24 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE AGGREGATE INSIDER TRADING INDICATORS FOR 
MONTHS WITH AND WITHOUT MAJOR ADJUSTMENT TO THE AOI SECTORIAL INDEX 
AND THE T-STATISTICS FOR COMPARING THE INDICATORS 
FOR THE DIFFERENT PERIODS 
INDUSTRY GROUP OF CONSOLIDATED ENTERPRISES 
Summary Statistics  
Variable Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of Average Standard Deviation 
Index in the next calendar Months 
month  
FREQBS <|10%| 53 2.023 1.9242 
FREQBS > o r = 1 0 % 6 8.3006 5.9585 
SHBS <|10%| 53 6.7018 17.048 
SHBS > o r = 1 0 % 6 22.408 39.546 
ASHB <|10%| 53 0.00040 0.0006 
ASHB > o r = 1 0 % 6 0.00010 0.0001 
ASHS <|10%| 53 0.00040 0.0007 
ASHS > o r = 1 0 % 6 0.00005 0.0001 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF r-values Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal 57 -5.72 <.0001 
FREQBS Unequal 5.12 -2.57 0.0492 
SHBS Equal 57 -1.82 0.0743 
SHBS Unequal 5.21 -0.96 0.3782 
ASHB Equal 57 1.14 0.2601 
ASHB Unequal 55.9 3.18 0.0024 
ASHS Equal 57 1.21 0.2331 
ASHS Unequal 55.2 ^ 0.0015 
Summary Statistics  
Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of 
Variable Index in the next calendar Month Average Standard Deviation 
month  
FREQBS c o r = -10% 7 2.2595 1.3054 
FREQBS <|10%| 53 2.023 1.9242 
SHBS c o r = -10% 7 3.7849 6.3561 
SHBS <|10%| 53 6.7018 17.048 
ASHB <or = -10% 7 0.00040 0.0007 
ASHB <|10%| 53 0.00040 0.0006 
ASHS <or = -10% 7 0.00050 0.0006 
ASHS <|1Q%| 53 0.00040 0-0007 
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TABLE 24 (CONTINUED) 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF "values Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal 58 0.31 0.7543 
FREQBS Unequal 9.84 0.42 0.6817 
SHBS Equal 58 -0.45 0.6574 
SHBS Unequal 20.7 -0.87 0.3946 
ASHB Equal 58 0.2 0.8418 
ASHB Unequal 7.32 0.18 0.8595 
ASHS Equal 58 0.23 0.8196 
ASHS Unequal 8.66 ^ 0.7925 
Summary Statistics  
Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of 
Variable Index in the next calendar Month Average Standard Deviation 
month  
FREQBS < |10%| 53 2.023 1.9242 
FREQBS < or = -10% and > or = 10% 6 4.6097 4.2744 
SHBS <|10%| 53 6.7018 17.048 
SHBS < or = -10% and > or = 10% 6 4.012 4.9969 
ASHB < |10%| 53 0.00040 0.0006 
ASHB < or = -10% and > or = 10% 6 0.00010 0.0001 
ASHS <|10%| 53 0.00040 0.0007 
ASHS < or =-10% and > or =10% 6 0.QQ04Q 0.0006 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF f-values Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal 57 -2.69 0.0093 
FREQBS Unequal 5.23 -1.47 0.2001 
SHBS Equal 57 0.38 0.7039 
SHBS Unequal 23 0.87 0.3954 
ASHB Equal 57 1.03 0.3064 
ASHB Unequal 47.4 2.74 0.0086 
ASHS Equal 57 0.14 0.8905 
ASHS Unequal ^ 0 J 6 0.8749 
147 
TABLE 24 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE AGGREGATE INSIDER TRADING INDICATORS FOR 
MONTHS WITH AND WITHOUT MAJOR ADJUSTMENT TO THE AOI SECTORIAL INDEX 
AND THE T-STATISTICS FOR COMPARING THE INDICATORS 
FOR THE DIFFERENT PERIODS 
INDUSTRY GROUP OF INDUSTRIALS 
Summary Statistics  
Variable Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of Average Standard Deviation 
Index in the next calendar Month 
month  
FREQBS <|10%| 63 3.4044 4.8466 
FREQBS > o r = 1 0 % 2 13.841 13.981 
SHBS <|10%| 63 3.0996 8.1664 
SHBS > o r = 1 0 % 2 3.4663 2.8945 
ASHB <|10%| 63 0.0004 0.0007 
ASHB > o r = 1 0 % 2 0.0002 0.0002 
ASHS <|10%| 63 0.0005 0.0009 
ASHS > o r = 10% 2 Q.0QQ05540 0.00000984 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF �l u e s Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal 63 -2.84 0.0061 
FREQBS Unequal 1.01 -1.05 0.4823 
SHBS Equal 63 -0.06 0.95 
SHBS Unequal 1.57 -0.16 0.891 
ASHB Equal 63 0.4 0.6941 
ASHB Unequal 2.23 1.29 0.3153 
ASHS Equal 63 0.73 0.4655 
ASHS Unequal 62.4 O.OOOl  
Summary Statistics  
Variable Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of Average Standard Deviation 
Index in the next calendar Months 
month  
FREQBS <or = -10% 3 6.5917 4.7301 
FREQBS <|10%| 63 3.4044 4.8466 
SHBS <or = -10% 3 64.947 106.26 
SHBS <|10%| 63 3.0996 8.1664 
ASHB <or = -10% 3 0.0002 0.0001 
ASHB <|10%| 63 0.0004 0.0007 
ASHS <or = -10% 3 0.0002 0.0003 
ASHS <|10%| 63 0-0005 0.0009 
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TABLE 24 (CONTINUED) 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF "values Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal 64 1.11 0.2696 
FREQBS Unequal 2.2 1.14 0.3633 
SHBS Equal 64 5.12 <.0001 
SHBS Unequal 2 1.01 0.4195 
ASHB Equal 64 -0.54 0.5909 
ASHB Unequal 23.1 -2.14 0.0429 
ASHS Equal 64 -0.7 0.4857 
ASHS Unequal 4 9 8 - L ^ 0.106 
Summary Statistics  
Variable Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of Average Standard Deviation 
Index in the next calendar Months 
month  
FREQBS <|10%| 63 3.4044 4.8466 
FREQBS < or = -10% a n d � o r =10% 4 7.3139 5.109 
SHBS <|10%| 63 3.0996 8.1664 
SHBS < or = -10% and > or = 10% 4 0.9439 0.742 
ASHB <|10%| 63 0.0004 0.0007 
ASHB <or = -10% a n d � o r二 10% 4 0.0001 0.0001 
ASHS <|10%| 63 0.0005 0.0009 
ASHS < or = -10% and > or = 10% 4 0.0003 0.0004 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF 厂values Prob H T  
FREQBS Equal 65 -1.56 0.1235 
FREQBS Unequal 3.35 -1.49 0.224 
SHBS Equal 65 0.52 0.602 
SHBS Unequal 58.7 1.97 0.0535 
ASHB Equal 65 0.77 0.4452 
ASHB Unequal 28.3 2.6 0.0148 
ASHS Equal 65 0.5 0.6163 
ASHS Unequal 5 0.3795 
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TABLE 24 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE AGGREGATE INSIDER TRADING INDICATORS FOR 
MONTHS WITH AND WITHOUT MAJOR ADJUSTMENT TO THE AOI SECTORIAL INDEX 
AND THE T-STATISTICS FOR COMPARING THE INDICATORS 
FOR THE DIFFERENT PERIODS 
INDUSTRY GROUP OF HOTELS 
Summary Statistics  
Variable Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of Average Standard Deviation 
Index in the next calendar Months 
month  
FREQBS <|10%| 32 5.287 5.936 
FREQBS > or = 10% 3 4.200 5.632 
SHBS <|10%| 32 13.067 17.838 
SHBS > o r = 1 0 % 3 0.435 0.740 
ASHB <|10%| 55 0.00004190 0.0001 
ASHB > o r = 1 0 % 5 0.00001260 0.00001380 
ASHS <|10%| 55 0.00000702 0.00002090 
ASHS > o r = l Q % 5 0.QQQ00323 Q.QQQQQ558 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF _ l u e s Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal 33 0.3 0.7630 
FREQBS Unequal 2.44 0.32 0.7757 
SHBS Equal 33 1.21 0.2349 
SHBS Unequal 32 3.97 0.0004 
ASHB Equal 58 0.53 0.5973 
ASHB Unequal 55.5 1.66 0.1018 
ASHS Equal 58 0.4 0.6896 
ASHS Unequal 18.5 I M 0.3268 
Summary Statistics  
Variable Adjustment in AOI Sectorial Number of Average Standard Deviation 
Index in the next calendar Months 
month  
FREQBS c o r = -10% 5 17.167 32.977 
FREQBS <|10%| 32 5.287 5.936 
SHBS c o r = -10% 5 34.199 61.617 
SHBS <|10%| 32 13.067 17.838 
ASHB <or = -10% 5 0.00000645 0.00001110 
ASHB <|10%| 55 0.00004190 0.00010000 
ASHS <or = -10% 5 0.00000507 0.00000945 
ASHS <|10%| 55 0.00000702 Q.0Q00209Q 
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TABLE 24 (CONTINUED) 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF r-values Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal 35 1.98 0.0555 
FREQBS Unequal 4.04 0.8 0.4663 
SHBS Equal 35 1.64 0.1094 
SHBS Unequal 4.11 0.76 0.4875 
ASHB Equal 58 -0.64 0.5222 
ASHB Unequal 57.8 -2.06 0.0438 
ASHS Equal 58 -0.2 0.8384 
ASHS Unequal 8.23 0-7116 
Summary Statistics  
Variable Adjustment in AOI Sectorial N Average Standard Deviation 
Index in the next calendar 
month  
FREQBS <|10%| 32 5.287 5.936 
FREQBS < or = -10% and > or = 10% 2 15.071 21.112 
SHBS <|10%| 32 13.067 17.838 
SHBS < or = -10% and > or = 10% 2 57.546 81.337 
ASHB <|10%| 55 0.00004190 0.0001 
ASHB < or = -10% and > or = 10% 4 0.00000934 0.00001030 
ASHS <|10%| 55 0.00000702 0.00002090 
ASHS < or = -10% and > or = 10% 4 0.00000131 0.00000257 
T-Tests  
Variable Variance DF "values Prob > |T  
FREQBS Equal 32 -1.94 0.0617 
FREQBS Unequal 1.01 -0.65 0.6305 
SHBS Equal 32 -2.69 0.0113 
SHBS Unequal 1.01 -0.77 0.5808 
ASHB Equal 57 0.53 0.5989 
ASHB Unequal 55.6 1.89 0.0643 
ASHS Equal 57 0.54 0.5899 
ASHS Unequal 44.2 L84 0.0719 
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